The Measurement of Labor Cost by Jack E. Triplett
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Measurement of Labor Cost
Volume Author/Editor: Jack E. Triplett, ed.




Chapter Title: Introduction: An Essay on Labor Cost
Chapter Author: Jack E. Triplett
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7372
Chapter pages in book: (p. 1 - 60)1  Introduction: 
An Essay on Labor Cost 
Jack E. Triplett 
It will require the concentration of  the minds of 
many . . . to make the most basic economic concept 
and its statistical equivalent fully meaningful for eco- 
nomic research. 
Oskar Morgenstern, On the Accuracy of Economic 
Observations 
1.1  Introduction 
Prices are at the heart of  economic analysis, so much so that the study 
of  the principles  governing  economic behavior  historically has  been 
termed “price theory.”  Not surprisingly, economists have expended a 
great amount of resources on  refining concepts that underlie the measure- 
ment of  prices and on evaluating the correspondence of  available mea- 
sures to the conceptual model.’ 
Wages are no less central to the study of labor markets. And the formal 
analysis of labor markets used to be called “the theory of wages.” But one 
looks in vain for labor market literature comparable to that available on 
the measurement of  prices. 
One can look at the matter in another way. Traditionally, inputs to the 
production  process have been  identified as labor and capital.  When 
volume 45 of  this series addressed the measurement of  capital (Usher 
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1980), it added to an extensive legacy of  research that was explicitly 
concerned with conceptual and empirical measurement problems. It is 
difficult to cite comparable material on the measurement of  labor input 
and labor cost. 
What accounts for this lacuna? Labor economists have often main- 
tained that wage rates and payment  mechanisms are too complex to 
permit generalization. Orley Ashenfelter noted in the discussion at the 
Williamsburg conference that a steel industry collective bargaining con- 
tract contains pages and pages of  wage rates for different occupations, 
grades, skill levels, and so forth. That is, of course, quite true. Yet, Oskar 
Morgenstern (1963) noted many years ago, in a passage in his classic book 
on measurement in economics, that the same thing was true of  prices in 
the iron and steel industry. Enormous price heterogeneity exists among 
different grades and types of steel, different methods of payment, deliv- 
ery terms, and so forth. (Stigler and Kindahl [1970, p. 51  note some 
unspecified multiple of  135 million different prices in the price structure 
for hot rolled carbon steel sheets.) The complexity of  the institutional 
structure of  steel pricing has never inhibited economists from generaliz- 
ing in that area, or from using the basic concepts of  economic theory to 
specify what is wanted of  price statistics. 
A different set of perceptions may also have suppressed the growth of 
literature on the measurement of labor market variables. With respect to 
the measurement of  consumption prices and of  capital, it has long been 
recognized that there are formidable and interesting theoretical problems 
to be attacked. The empirical measurement literature in both of  these 
areas has been stimulated by, and has proceeded in concert with, theoret- 
ical work (more or less; one could easily cite empirical price measure- 
ment  literature that appears oblivious to, and badly in  need of, the 
theoretical side of  the subject). Recognition that labor markets pose 
equally complex measurement issues has lagged among theorists, and 
one hears in casual conversation quite the opposite assessment-that 
labor market analysis contains no particular or unique difficulties. This 
view, assuming it is widely held, has no doubt inhibited the entry into 
labor market measurement of the kinds of resources that long have been 
expended on other areas of  measurement in economics. Yet, the theo- 
rists’ assessment seems highly peculiar: Most of the problems that make 
capital such a challenging conceptual problem in economics have analogs 
on the labor side. And in a number of respects, labor markets pose more 
complex and interesting theoretical problems than the ones usually con- 
sidered in the measurement of, say, consumer prices. 
I will elaborate on these matters later in this essay. It is sufficient to 
note here that neither the labor economists’ idea that the subject is too 
complex nor the theorists’ notion that it is too simple justifies the neglect 
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I do not, of course, mean to suggest that the contributions of theorists 
and labor economists are without value in understanding the measure- 
ment of wages, compensation, or labor cost. Clearly, much of the work 
on price indexes is transferable to labor market measurement. And the 
literature on capital, having  (as is must)  analogs on the labor side, 
suggests approaches that are fruitful. 
It is also quite true that a vast amount of recent quantitative research by 
labor economists, and a fair amount of the work of the older institutional- 
ist school as well, does have implications for the kinds of  data that are 
relevant and necessary for economic analysis of labor markets. Research 
on “earnings functions” clarifies earnings concepts (see Griliches 1977), 
as does exploration of  “compensating differentials” (C. Brown 1980); 
work on the relation between education and productivity defines the units 
in which labor input is appropriately measured. 
Much of  the measurement work in labor economics, however, has 
reflected a labor supply perspective.  When innovations in theoretical 
labor market measurement concepts have occurred, they have had sup- 
ply-side orientations: The work of  Pencavel (1977) and Cleeton (1982) 
concerns the concept of real wages-that  is, worker income. Most new 
data sets developed over the last two decades represent responses to the 
perceived need for data to study worker behavior. (I have in mind not 
only the establishment of  the National Longitudinal Surveys of  Labor 
Market Experience,  the  Panel Study of  Income  Dynamics,  and the 
several Income Maintenance Experiments, but also the relatively recent 
exploitation of the panel properties in the Current Population Survey to 
produce analytic data which can be used to examine worker behavior.)2 
Though research can often be milked for implications for economic 
behavior on both sides of the market, there is a dearth of  direct explora- 
tion of employers’ behavior toward their work forces, and very little data 
exist for addressing such questions. The demand side of the labor market 
has been neglected  in research, in conceptual work, and in data de- 
velopment  .3 
To claim that existing research lacks implications for measurement in 
labor markets would be extravagant and untrue. I do maintain that the 
effort expended  on drawing implications for economic measurement 
from existing knowledge about the operation of labor markets has been 
sparse relative to other areas of economics, and the balance of that effort 
has been disproportionately on the supply side. 
Thus, not only to hold the subject matter within reasonable bounds, 
but  also to push  the measurement literature  in the direction  of  the 
greatest gaps, the program of  this conference was organized to focus on 
labor cost, rather than on “compensation” or “earnings” as a measure of 
worker income. Obviously, this distinction is somewhat artificial and is 
neither strictly nor uniformly maintained in the papers included in this 4  Jack E. Triplett 
volume. The labor cost focus does, however, define the perimeters of this 
introductory essay, which has been conceived as an introduction to the 
subject of  the conference, not as a summary of  its individual contribu- 
tions. 
This essay has one main  and one subsidiary theme. The principal 
theme concerns the conceptual framework for measuring the cost of 
employing labor-the  measurement of a factor price. Its initial statement 
in section 1.2 is abstract and simplified, based on a highly stylized model 
of production cost; it is developed and expanded in subsequent sections 
to accommodate relevant empirical knowledge of  labor markets. The 
perspective on this research is intended to highlight the distinction in 
economic measurement between demand-side and supply-side measure- 
ment concepts. The subsidiary theme draws parallels and contrasts for 
labor cost measurement from the theoretical and empirical price mea- 
surement literature. 
1.2  The Theoretical Concept of Labor Cost 
By  the term “labor cost” I mean the employer’s cost of  hiring an 
incremental unit of labor. The labor cost concept concerns the definition 
of a factor price: It is the cost of a unit of input (and not a measure of  the 
cost of  the labor content of  a unit of  output). I use “labor cost,” rather 
than “factor price” or “wage,” to acknowledge the complexity of  labor 
hiring costs and to emphasize that all costs of employment are included, 
not just direct wage payments. And I use “labor cost” in preference to 
“compensation” because the latter connotes a measure of labor income, 
which differs conceptually and empirically  from a measure of factor cost. 
Labor cost measures are wanted for diverse purposes, for example, 
production function estimation, inflation analysis, and forming intertem- 
poral, interarea, or interindustry judgments about the cost levels or cost 
experiences of different classes of employers. The most flexible data for 
analytical purposes are microdata-labor  cost levels (i.e.,  dollars per 
period) for individual employers, with abundant detail on cost compo- 
nents, plus labor force and employer characteristics. For aggregated or 
tabulated data, analytical needs specify that published data be available 
at detailed occupational, industrial, and regional disaggregations, again 
with detail on components of  labor cost. 
However the data are presented, some aggregation is normally re- 
quired to conserve resources-either the user’s or those of the compiling 
statistical agency. Microdata on firms (such as the data employed by 
Smith  and Ehrenberg in  this volume)  are normally aggregated over 
workers. Moreover, under the hedonic view of  labor markets even the 
wage rate or labor cost measure for a single worker is an aggregation of 
lower order cost measures when labor is not homogeneous, as shown in 5  An Essay on Labor Cost 
section 1.6. To begin with the theory of  aggregate measurements is not 
idle theorizing, but is rather a statement of  the necessary starting place 
for any systematic exploration of  measurement  issue^.^ 
For a measure of  input cost, aggregation rules can be extracted from 
the economic theory of  production and of production cost. Aspects of the 
theory are discussed in the Gollop-Jorgenson and McMenamin-Russell 
papers in this volume (see also Diewert 1980, and Caves, Christensen, 
and Diewert 1982). For present purposes, production theory is highly 
stylized. Yet, most of the empirical and conceptual issues discussed in this 
volume can be interpreted as attempts to extend and to make more 
realistic the stylized picture of  the labor market depicted in the theory of 
demand for inputs. 
(1)  Q=  Q (K,  L,  MI, 
where Q is output, K and L  are vectors of the various types of capital and 
labor services employed, and M is a vector of  materials usage.  The 
elements of  the L vector may be thought of  as different occupations, 
different skill groupings or human  capital levels, and so forth. It is 
assumed that each element of  the L vector groups workers who  are 
homogeneous. A similar interpretation holds for the K and M vectors. 
Beginning the analysis  with a production function implies that it applies 
to an establishment or plant, or to a production process within an estab- 
lishment. Because “industry” can be defined as a group of establishments 
having closely related production processes, input cost measures can be 
rationalized  for an industry or for industry groups by  appeal to the 
Marshallian notion of the “representative firm,” though that rationaliza- 
tion may need elaboration to incorporate heterogeneity in firm size and 
entrepreneurial inputs,  as emphasized by  Oi in  the present  volume. 
Despite the continued popularity of  aggregate, nationwide production 
functions in a variety of empirical applications, we take it as evident that 
none exists. Economy-wide measures of  factor costs are best interpreted 
as averages of  individual industry  measures  (the same interpretation 
applies to aggregate productivity measures or to any other measurement 
that is derived from a production theoretic point of view). 
Associated  with equation  (1) is a production cost function, which 
shows total production cost as a function of input prices, given that input 
quantities are combined in such a way as to minimize production cost for 
each output level. To keep notation compact, this cost function is de- 
noted by 
(2)  C=  C (R,  W,  P; Q), 
where R, W, and Pare  understood as vectors of the costs per unit of input 
for the various productive factors contained in the vectors K, L, and M, 
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respectively. For a casual labor market, the cost of  a unit of  labor is 
primarily the wage rate. Similar simplifications are usually made with 
respect to unit capital service costs (rental rates) and materials prices. 
When the  level of output is fixed, the cost function of equation (2) gives 
the minimum cost necessary to reach a particular production isoquant . 
Further, when relative prices vary, with output held constant, the cost 
function will yield different cost levels corresponding to varying points on 
the isoquant. Such points-minimum  cost combinations of factor inputs 
that lie on the same production isoquant-provide  a natural basis for 
comparisons of  aggregate input price levels. A ratio of  these points is 
called an index number-in  this particular case, an “input cost index.  ”5 
An index number is thus an aggregation that is grounded on an eco- 
nomic concept. It can be used for making statements about interarea or 
interfirm differences of levels, as well as for the more familiar intertem- 
poral computations. 
Most of  the content of the economic theory of index number measure- 
ments (see Samuelson and Swamy 1974, or Diewert 1981) concerns the 
following three topics. 
The Form of  the Index Number 
An index number computation that is consistent with a specified pro- 
duction or cost function is termed an “exact” index for the underlying 
cost or production function (Diewert 1976). The form or “formula” of an 
exact  index number  depends  on the mathematical  form of  the cost 
function (which, in turn, is derived from the form of  the production 
function). Gollop and Jorgenson, for example, present index numbers 
that are exact for a translog production function.6 
Goodness of Approximations 
Widely known standard index number formulas, such as Laspeyres or 
Paasche or Fisher’s Ideal, use only price and quantity information, not 
the full cost function, They can be interpreted as approximations to the 
theoretically correct, or exact, index numbers. They are approximations 
because their input quantity weights can only approximately hold output 
constant over the index comparison. The exact index number, because it 
is formed from two points on  the same production isoquant, holds output 
exactly constant. With the approximations, an output error of  undeter- 
mined size is introduced into the index every time the fixed input assump- 
tion  is  violated  by  changes in  relative  input prices  (the well-known 
“substitution  bias”  of  fixed-weight  indexes).  Recent  empirical  and 
theoretical work indicates that good approximations to exact indexes can 
be computed from fixed-weight or related formulas.’ 
Ordinary regressions that include a dummy variable for time, region, 
or some other variable of interest can also be interpreted as approxima- 
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usually unclear unless the relation between the regression and the cost 
function is known. 
Subindexes 
One frequently wants a measure less aggregative than the index of  all 
input costs. An index of labor cost is one of  these “midlevel” aggrega- 
tions-a  measure of the aggregate employment cost of all occupations or 
labor groups in the W vector of equation (2). Following Pollak (19754, 
the labor cost index is termed a “subindex” of the full input cost index. 
The Bureau of  Labor Statistics (BLS) “Employment Cost Index” (de- 
scribed in Antos, this volume) is such a subindex. Lower level subin- 
dexes, such as a labor cost index for blue-collar workers, may also be 
desired. 
Three results  from the theory of  subindexes are important for the 
present discussion. First, though it is natural to suppose that an index of 
labor cost would require only data on labor, this is true only for special 
cases. As McMenamin and Russell note in their paper in this volume, 
Blackorby, Primont, and Russell (1978) have shown that only when the 
cost function is  separable on its labor component will  the labor cost 
subindex be independent of  capital service costs, materials prices, and 
technology. This separability condition is roughlys equivalent to saying 
that optimal combinations of  engineers and laborers do not depend on 
the proportions of machines and shovels used in the production process, 
or on the technology and mix of energy and other materials employed- 
clearly a condition unlikely to be satisfied empirically. Pollak (1975~) 
considers the interpretation of subindexes when the separability condi- 
tions do not hold. 
Second, the aggregate input cost index will not necessarily be con- 
structed out of subindexes for capital, labor, and materials costs (R, W, 
and P). In other words,  subindexes constructed  in the theoretically 
appropriate way do not necessarily “add up” in the manner of  ordinary 
fixed-weight index number formulas. 
Third, if  the theoretical conditions for the aggregation of labor inputs 
hold empirically (or if  they are just maintained), the exact subindex of 
labor cost can be approximated by a conventional index number formula, 
such as Laspeyres or Paasche, in a way analogous to the case of the full 
input cost index. 
One would like the theory to provide the conceptual underpinnings for 
aggregate measures of labor cost. Beyond this, the underlying conceptual 
framework used in the measurement design provides internal consistency 
in the data and determines its relevance for the intended use; for this 
reason, even if  researchers use micro data, rather than some aggregate 
index number, the conceptual measurement model is an issue for all data 
employed for research. 
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measurement implies difficulties in two areas-restrictiveness,  and real- 
ism or relevance. With respect to the restrictiveness problem, production 
aggregation theory tells us that stringent separability conditions must be 
met for labor input or labor cost to be a valid aggregation, and knowledge 
of  production suggests that these conditions are unlikely to hold. For 
example, Berndt and Christensen (1973) rejected the proposition that 
white-collar and blue-collar labor could be aggregated, no doubt partly 
because white-collar labor and capital structures were found to be com- 
plements. Grant and Hamermesh (1981) examined five labor categories 
and  (aggregate)  capital,  and  likewise  found  no  support  for  labor 
aggregation  .9 
Moreover, whatever may be true for capital and labor inputs,  the line 
separating capital and labor costs frequently becomes blurred, particu- 
larly for costs of  safety, workplace amenities, and other aspects of  em- 
ployment that contribute to what labor economists call “compensating 
wage differentials.” For these cases, employers (or some third party) can 
influence labor cost (a price) by use of a larger quantity of capital or some 
other input. 
Even though separability is a required condition for the construction of 
consistent labor cost measures, the consequences of  violation of  the 
separability conditions are empirical, and in some cases may not be all 
that serious. Berndt and Christensen (1974) find that assuming labor 
separability when it is  untrue has little consequence for using factor 
quantities to analyze output and productivity movements, but seriously 
distorts the prediction of factor shares; since the latter use would employ 
factor prices as data, their finding reinforces our concern. 
In any event, there is little in the theory or the empirical knowledge of 
production that validates the normal disposition of economists to think of 
“labor” and “capital” as natural aggregations. The conventional practice 
has mainly custom and supply-side considerations behind it. 
With respect to the relevance of  the model, it should be emphasized 
that the stylized production cost model, or close alternatives, is in com- 
mon use in empirical research.  It hardly represents a methodological 
straw man.  The degree of  realism in the model underlying empirical 
research is a compromise that depends on the problem at hand. Yet, it is 
beyond debate that the stylized model needs more descriptive realism to 
engage many of  the empirical issues of  the day. 
There are at least four major respects in which the stylized model of 
production cost is inadequate. Though the Williamsburg conference did 
not give full attention to all four, it will nevertheless be convenient to 
discuss relevant research in labor markets and its implications for the 
measurement of  labor cost in terms of  these four topic areas. 
1. In the stylized model, it is  assumed that only wages matter as a 
measure of  factor cost. That assumption need not necessarily be iden- 9  An Essay on Labor Cost 
tified with a view that benefits and job amenity costs do not exist or that 
they are small enough so that their level can be ignored (a view that would 
probably be ascribed to  by almost no user of the stylized model). Rather, 
it says (a) that total compensation is a simple addition of  the cost of 
benefits to the cost of  direct wage payments, and (b) that benefit levels 
are so strongly correlated with wages that little additional information on 
labor cost is imparted by gathering data on benefits. I believe this point of 
view is quite widespread, as it implicitly underlies a great amount of 
research on labor markets. These issues are addressed in section 1.3 of 
this essay. 
2.  The stylized model ignores time dimensions in employment  ar- 
rangements, as well as time dimensions inherent in payment mechanisms. 
In  effect, the stylized model depicts a casual labor market  in which 
neither workers nor employers have any interest in each other after the 
completion of, and payment for, the current period’s labor services. Of 
course, both employers and workers do care about the stream over time 
of labor services provided and payments received, a fact that has moti- 
vated much recent labor market research. The implications for measuring 
labor cost are discussed in sections 1.4 and 1.5. 
3.  The stylized model implies that there is some level of aggregation of 
the labor input below which one can view workers as homogeneous. The 
model is inchoate on problems of  labor quality that cannot be handled 
adequately by grouping. Methods for allowing for labor quality in a labor 
cost measure are discussed in section 1.6. 
4.  Partly because it relates to a single employer’s decision making, the 
stylized model is silent on  the heterogeneity of employers and of employ- 
ment conditions. However, just as employers care about the productive 
characteristics of  workers, workers care about the characteristics of em- 
ployers. This is a major contrast with the framework usually employed 
for the analysis of  product markets, in which one usually assumes that the 
seller exchanges a package of  commodities (this is the hedonic view of 
markets)  for  a money payment,  but  does not  demand a package  of 
commodities  in  return.  Labor market  transactions, however,  involve 
exchanges of packages on both sides of  the market. This assures addi- 
tional  complexity that is ignored  in  the stylized model.  This topic is 
addressed in section 1.6. The empirical importance of the heterogeneity 
of  employers is also  a major theme  of  Oi in this volume, and that 
discussion need not be duplicated here. 
1.3  Benefits 
Recognition of the importance of employer provided benefits in calcu- 
lating labor cost goes back many years. Legally mandated benefit costs 
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assumed importance in the 1930s. Negotiated benefits grew faster than 
wages during World War I1 because those costs were less tightly con- 
trolled than were direct wage payments. (McMenamin and Russell in this 
volume indicate the same thing was true of  “controls” programs in the 
1970s.) Both classes of benefits have grown steadily over the intervening 
years, whether measured in absolute terms or as a percentage of  labor 
cost, a fact well known and tabulated in the Smeeding and Hamermesh 
papers in this volume. 
Employer provided benefits pose a number of issues for the measure- 
ment of  labor cost. The wage-benefit model sketched in section 1.3.1 
serves to organize the discussion of  empirical issues in the following 
sections. 
1.3.1  A Wage-Benefit Model 
A crucial parameter in analyzing the size and composition of employer 
provided benefits is the wage that “workers would forgo to obtain the 
benefit”  (Freeman 1981, p. 491). We assume that workers gain utility 
from benefits (B),  from the goods and services they purchase with direct 
wage payments (G), and from leisure (T,, -  L).  The worker’s full income 
constraint is 
(3)  To(W + JIBIL)  = JIB + PG + (W + JIBIL)  (To -  L)  , 
where  To is total time available,  W the hourly wage, BIL the hourly 
benefit earning rate, P and G the price and quantity of  consumption 
goods, L hours worked, and JI the shadow price of benefits.’”  Assuming 
benefits earned per hour are independent of hours worked, when an hour 
of  leisure is consumed a worker gives up the quantity of  goods that an 
hour’s labor earns (WIP) and an hour’s worth of benefits, BIL. Accord- 
ingly, we may write the labor supply of  workers of a specified quality to 
the firm” as: 
(4)  L = L(  WIP, BIL)  . 
Setting P equal to unity, one can invert the labor supply condition, giving 
(5)  W=  W(B,  L,  1). 
Equation (5) states that the wage that must be paid by  the employer 
depends on the number of hours of worker input hired and on the level of 
benefits. 
The theory specifies that 
(6a)  a WIaB 5  0 ; 
(6b)  awiaLro; 
That workers will accept lower wages for greater benefits, or demand 
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assuming that market purchased goods and services and employer pro- 
vided benefits are both normal goods, though the lower limit of  the 
workers’ willingness to substitute is zero. For the conventional competi- 
tive firm, the change in wages necessary to expand or contract the firm’s 
labor force while minimizing cost (condition [6b]) is zero; for other cases, 
the normal presumption is that higher wages must be paid to attract more 
workers, so condition (6b) will be positive. The analysis at this point 
abstracts from dynamic considerations, so that the rate of hiring does not 
enter into equation (5),  only the level of  employment (see Phelps et al. 
1970). 
Though there may be scale economies to the provision of  benefits (it 
may be cheaper per worker for the employer to buy a group insurance 
policy than for each worker to obtain the same coverage in an individual 
policy), it seems reasonable to assume that the marginal cost of increasing 
the size of a benefit is positive and either constant (for example, the cost 
of $Wlife  insurance is Utimes the cost of an $Vpolicy) or rising. Thus, if 
Ei is the employer’s expenditure on benefit Bi, 
(7) 
The firm will arrange its package of wages and benefits to minimize the 
cost of hiring L workers, given the above conditions. The cost-minimizing 
conditions determining the optimal amounts of  benefits to be provided 
are 
(8)  dEiIdBi = -aW1dBi,  for all i. 
Equation (8) says that employers offer benefits up to the point where the 
incremental cost of each benefit just equals the saving in wage cost that 
can be gained as a result of offering the benefit.’*  The wage rate offered is 
determined by simultaneously solving equation (5) for the desired level of 
L. 
An implication that will be useful later is that a benefit will be increased 
only when the quantity on the right-hand side of  equation (8) is greater 
(in absolute value) than that on the left-hand side. Since the left-hand 
side is always positive, this implies that employers will not offer a benefit 
unless the workers’ wage-benefit trade-off for that benefit is greater than 
zero. We return to this point in section 1.3.3. 
A number of factors may be expected to influence the parameters of 
this model: 
1. Assuming benefits are normal goods, more will be demanded at 
higher income levels. This will increase the value of B in equation (4) for 
any given L,  regardless of  the effect on condition (6a). Moreover, the 
absolute value of  (6a) may itself grow larger with income if  benefits are 
more income-elastic than market purchased goods, thus strengthening 
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2.  When benefits are not taxed, but wage payments are, this increases 
the wages that workers would forgo to get benefits. From the workers’ 
point of  view, what is being surrendered is not consumption goods with a 
value equivalent to aEi/aBi (the employers’ marginal cost of  providing 
the benefit), but rather  goods having the value of  (dEi/aBi).(l -  t), 
where t is the marginal tax rate.I3 Thus, higher marginal tax rates will 
increase the absolute value of (6a), when that condition is computed on 
before-tax wage data.I4 
3.  Empirically it has been shown (Freeman 1981 and Mellow 1982) 
that unions increase the share of benefits in total compensation, presum- 
ably by increasing the absolute value of (6a). The precise mechanism for 
this union effect is un~1ear.l~ 
4. Speculation has it that demographic factors may also affect the 
value of  (6a), with older workers, for example, possibly having greater 
preferences for benefits than younger ones, and married workers greater 
than single ones. Women may have different preferences for benefits 
than do men, but the effect on (6a) could go either way. The “working 
spouse” model would lower values for (6a), on the grounds that a spouse 
participates in health plans and so forth provided by  the spouse’s em- 
ployer (this argument applies as well to married men, as the family’s need 
for health care would be met by whichever worker received the most 
favorable terms from his or her employer); on the other hand, the “single 
parent” model of female preferences should produce higher values for 
(6a), and hence, in this case, women would demand greater levels of 
benefits, other things equa1.16 
The preceding four factors originate from the workers side. The level 
of benefits is also responsive to factors that affect the employers’ cost of 
providing benefits. 
5. Mellow (1982) and Oi (this volume) present evidence that large 
firms supply more benefits, partly because their size gives them scale 
economies in purchasing them. Mitchell and Andrews (1981) present 
evidence supporting the existence of  scale economies in pension plan 
administration. In the case of scale economies, the level of benefits goes 
up because the left-hand side of  equation (8) falls. Oi, in this volume, 
suggests other reasons for an association between firm size and benefit 
levels. 
6.  Many benefits (pensions  and vacations, for example) are inter- 
locked with tenure and therefore with firm-specific human capital. This 
says that equation (@-which  predicts that wages and benefit costs trade 
off at equilibrium on a dollar-for-dollar basis-needs  to be modified to 
accommodate cases where there are other important labor cost compo- 
nents (hiring and turnover costs, for example) that are impacted dif- 
ferently by wage and benefit changes. 
7.  Condition  (8)  also  needs  modification where  workers and  em- 
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tion  of  a  single period’s labor cost  (or worker  compensation)  must 
accommodate to a multiperiod optimization plan (these considerations 
motivate the “implicit contract” literature). The last two extensions of 
the wage-benefit model are left for section 1.4. 
1.3.2  Do Benefits Matter? 
For computing trends in labor cost, it is clear that benefits must be 
included. Were benefits omitted, time series analyses would understate 
the growth in labor cost. 
But for other analytical purposes, labor economists disagree whether 
the omission of  benefits from labor cost measures is necessarily a serious 
liability. A widely used undergraduate textbook (Fleisher and Kniesner 
1980, p. 23) states one position on this issue: 
When measures of  the cost of  fringe benefits are not available, the 
question  arises,  To  what  extent  is  the  analysis of  labor  markets 
affected? . . .  [I]n general it is probably true that the amount of  fringe 
benefits is positively related to nominal wage rates. Thus, the principal 
effect would be to understate real wage costs more or less consistently 
by  a fraction.  The effect of  this error on most studies is probably 
relatively unimportant. 
In the following, we  refer to this point of  view  as the “consistency” 
hypothesis. 
The consistency hypothesis is not necessarily at odds with the theoreti- 
cal model  of  section  1.3.1. Solutions to the labor cost minimization 
problem  could  “stack  up”  along a  path of  constant  benefit-to-wage 
proportions, so that wage rates would be a consistent fraction of  labor 
cost for all employers and all groups of  workers. For the consistency 
hypothesis to hold in data for workers at the same earnings level, those 
workers must all have similar utility functions, and employers must incur 
similar costs for providing benefits. For consistency to hold across earn- 
ings levels, in the absence of taxes, unitary income elasticities, both for 
market-purchased goods and for benefits, are required, plus constant 
marginal cost schedules for benefits. When taxes enter the system, and 
wages but not benefits are taxed, marginal rax rates must vary with 
(nonunitary) income elasticities so that the effects just offset each other, 
or so that the combined effect just balances any change in the employer’s 
marginal cost of providing benefits. Whether the consistency hypothesis 
is true is therefore an empirical matter, which  requires a fortuitous 
confluence of  values of  the economic parameters that determine the 
proportion of  benefits in total labor cost. 
Several papers in the present volume provide evidence on the con- 
sistency hypothesis. Both Smeeding and Leibowitz ask whether the addi- 
tion of  benefit costs (and in Smeeding’s case the value of  benefits to 
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human capital earnings equations. Both authors conclude that one gets 
the same results from earnings equations that contain only wages as from 
those where the dependent variable is augmented to include benefit costs. 
Neither conclusion, however, is unchallenged. Smeeding himself notes 
that the microsimulation methods he uses to construct his data base have 
a tendency to reduce the variance of the benefits data, a point emphasized 
and elaborated upon by Martin David in his comment. In effect, micro- 
simulation methods have imposed or partly imposed the consistency 
hypothesis on the data, so it is not too surprising that the empirical results 
support the hypothesis. 
Leibowitz’s data are from a new and relatively unexplored survey and 
would appear to  be ideal for testing the consistency  hypothesis. However, 
Atrostic points out in her comment that Leibowitz’s benefits data cover 
only roughly a third of  total benefit costs as measured in other surveys, 
and she presents evidence that the consistency hypothesis holds only for 
those benefits that were included in Leibowitz’s survey; the hypothesis is 
rejected when other benefits (especially pension cost) are added to the 
list. 
In summary, then, we have two authors who present results supporting 
the consistency hypothesis, but those commenting on their papers (and 
one of the authors himself) emphasize deficiencies in the data employed 
for their tests. 
Complete agreement will never be found between any two sets of data, 
so determining whether the addition of benefits to wages matters at all is 
not a very interesting question. The relevant issue is: How much does it 
matter? How does one determine whether an alternative concept of labor 
cost (for example, one inclusive of benefit costs) is really “better”? 
Hamermesh deals with the issue in a way that stresses its economic 
relevance. He asks whether the measurement change affects an economi- 
cally relevant result (labor demand elasticities),” and whether the change 
in measurement concept moves the estimate in the direction that would 
be predicted from econometric theory. 
He finds that the addition of  benefit costs and other aspects of  labor 
cost to the normal average hourly earnings measures increases the esti- 
mated elasticity of  demand for labor, and he argues that this result is 
predicted on  a priori grounds. That is, if labor cost were mismeasured, an 
errors-in-variables econometric argument suggests that labor demand 
elasticity estimates are biased toward zero. Thus, the fact that elasticity 
estimates increase when benefits are added to wages indicates that the 
labor cost measure inclusive of benefits is the better one, even though the 
change in the elasticity estimates is not statistically significant. Lazear is 
not fully convinced by  this argument, emphasizing instead  that what 
appear to be the theoretically preferable labor cost measures do not 
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wages that Lazear most questions but some of  the other Hamermesh 
adjustments). 
Freeman’s (1981) orientation is similar to that of Hamermesh, for he 
indirectly tests the consistency hypothesis by comparing alternative esti- 
mates of the economic effect of  unions. The union effect on compensa- 
tion (wages plus benefit costs) is roughly 17 percent, compared with a 15 
percent union differential measured from wages alone.  l8 From this and 
other results, Freeman concludes that “standard estimates of  the union 
wage effect understate the differential between unionized and otherwise 
comparable nonunion workers” (Freeman 1981, p. 509). Other research 
on the consistency question has been done by Duncan (1976), Atrostic 
(1981), and Mellow (1982). 
It seems doubtful that consistency between wage and benefit costs will 
be great enough to warrant the omission of benefits from labor cost data. 
The relatively recent expansion of the BLS Employment Cost Index to 
include benefits seems a justified and necessary improvement that makes 
it a better measure for analytic purposes. 
1.3.3  Is There a Market Trade-off between Wages and Benefits? 
This is an old research chestnut. Few issues in labor economics have 
provoked more controversy than this one. The controversy reflects the 
persistence  of  the theoretic-institutionalist split in  this field  (see the 
exchange between Dunlop 1977 and Ehrenberg, Hamermesh, and John- 
son 1977). 
On the one hand is the theoretical position. If  employers are cost 
minimizers and workers are utility maximizers, then it must be true that, 
other things equal, a market trade-off between wages and benefits exists. 
The labor market institutionalists’ response says, more or less, that the 
theory may predict a negative trade-off, but the labor market does not 
work that way. The institutionalist school frequently cites evidence that 
wages and benefits are positively correlated-the  highest paying jobs 
have the highest benefits. This, of course, is predicted by the theory itself, 
as noted in section 1.3.1. The theory does not state that the president of 
the company should receive lower benefits than the janitor, but rather 
that the negative trade-off between wages and benefits will be found at 
comparable skill levels and at comparable levels of total compensation. 
The negative trade-off occurs for job comparisons for which other things 
are held equal. 
Smith and Ehrenberg in the present volume attempt to assemble a 
body of  data in which other things can be held constant in order to  test the 
theoretical prediction of a negative trade-off between wages and benefits. 
Their study fails to produce evidence to confirm the negative trade-off 
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required to perform an adequate test; their conclusion is endorsed and 
enlarged upon by Charles Brown in his comment. 
It is surprising that the wage-benefit trade-off question should have 
become a serious research issue. It was pointed out in section 1.3.1 that 
the theoretical model implies that wherever the wage-benefit trade-off 
does not exist, employers will offer no benefits (see eq. [8]). Thus, testing 
for  the existence of a negative wage-benefit trade-off can be pursued with 
a much simpler research strategy than the one followed by Smith and 
Ehrenberg. All one has to do to “test” for the existence of a wage-benefit 
trade-off is to find out whether employer provided benefits exist! 
Of course, such a test will hardly satisfy the critics of  a theoretical 
approach to labor market analysis, for taking an empirical prediction as 
an implication-and therefore a test-of the theory requires accepting 
the relevance of the theory, and that is exactly what the critics deny. They 
argue that firms are not cost minimizers, that workers are not utility 
maximizers, or that the labor market contains so many deviations from 
market equilibrium that the exceptions overpower the generalizations. If 
the critic does not accept the relevance of  the theoretical model for labor 
market research, it is very unlikely that testing the wage-benefit relation 
for a negative slope will do much to settle the issue, or that any research 
results based on implications of  a theoretical model will convince. 
Serious research on relations between wages and benefits has to take 
the existence of  a wage-benefit trade-off as a necessarily true axiom. And 
if one accepts the theoretical model, it is unnecessary to design a compli- 
cated research project to confirm it, for the most elemental fact of  the 
labor market (that benefits do  exist) provides sufficient evidence that the 
wage-benefit trade-off part of  the theory is true. 
It is quite a different story if  one wishes to estimate the size of  the 
wage-benefit trade-off. That is a reasonable research project. However, 
research on the slope of  the wage-benefit  trade-off function must consider 
labor cost components other than wages or benefits. This is easily shown. 
Suppose the firm’s labor cost is composed of  three groups of  cost 
components-direct wage and salary payments (W),  benefits expressed 
as quantities (B),  and the hiring and turnover rate (H). Labor cost per 
unit of  labor is 
(9)  LC = W + OLB  + yH, 
where OL is the cost per unit of benefits ( = aEilaBi  in eq. [7]), and y is the 
cost of  a unit change in the turnover rate. Assuming no scale economies in 
the provision of  benefits and constant cost for each hirehumover, the 
usual mathematical manipulation gives expressions for the wage-benefit 
trade-off ,  which are: 
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or 
dW/d(aB)  = 1  + (yh)  (dHIdB). 
Thus, from the employer’s point of view, minimization of the labor cost 
function implies that the (negative) trade-off between the quantity of 
benefits and wages equals the marginal cost of benefits (as in eq. [8]) plus 
the cost of  any change in turnover induced by  changing the level of 
benefits. Alternatively (eq. [lob]), benefit costs and wage costs trade off 
on a one-for-one basis in the employer’s labor cost function only when 
benefits have no effect on turnover (aH/dB  = 0), or when turnover has no 
Neither of  the latter two conditions is at all probable. In fact, benefits 
that are related to tenure-vacations  and pensions, for example-are 
frequently designed to reduce turnover (further implications of  turnover 
costs are discussed in section 1.4). In the presence of  turnover costs, 
reducing benefits by (say) one dollar and raising wages by one dollar may 
not leave total labor cost unchanged. This implies that data on wages or 
salaries and benefits in different firms may not be adequate for exploring 
wage-benefit trade-offs or employer behavior,  if  the employers have 
pursued different strategies with respect to turnover. 
At the employer’s cost-minimizing point, a dollar spent on each labor 
cost component must have the same effect on labor supply to the firm. 
The optimal combination of  wage, benefit, and turnover costs in the 
one-period case will be determined by an expanded set of  conditions 
comparable to equation (8), which incorporate information on worker 
behavior in an analogous manner to equations (3)-(8). These conditions 
are omitted here in the interest of brevity, since the outline of the solution 
is suggested by the preceding discussion. It should be noted, however, 
that because of the information required, determining the optimal com- 
bination of  labor cost components is not a simple problem for the em- 
ployer, even in a single period setting (and, as noted in section 1.4, the 
problem is properly viewed in a multiperiod optimization context). 
To  summarize, researchers sometimes have data on the &st of benefits 
and sometimes on the quantity of  benefits that are provided to workers. 
Since it must be true that employers ultimately care only about the size of 
the total labor payment and not about its distribution among the various 
components of  compensation, it is tempting to conclude that wages trade 
for benefits on a dollar-for-dollar basis, and some researchers have made 
use of  such an assumption for empirical work. But even ignoring scale 
economies in the provision of  benefits, marginal tax rate advantages to 
obtaining  benefits in  nontaxable  form, and other  reasons frequently 
mentioned  as causal elements in  determining  the level of  employer 
provided  benefits,  analysis of  benefits requires  information  on other 
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labor cost components and cannot proceed on the basis of  wage and 
benefit information alone. 
1.3.4  How Should Benefits Be Measured? 
Researchers sometimes feel that “how” questions are mundane issues 
that do not pose any particular analytic difficulties. The discussion that 
took place at the Williamsburg conference suggests otherwise. 
It is generally agreed that medical and other insurance benefits should 
be handled as  if the labor cost element were the premium associated with 
coverage, rather than the actual insurance payout (see Nichols; McMena- 
min and Russell; Hamermesh; Lazear; Smeeding; and David, all in this 
volume). For example, if a company were to self-insure medical benefits 
and its workers were hit by an epidemic, one would treat the cost of  the 
epidemic as a loss on the firm’s insurance business and not as an increase 
in labor cost in the period in which the epidemic occurred. Many other 
issues can in principle be handled the same way. In practice, of  course, 
one seldom has a good estimate for the premium that a firm would pay if it 
were not self-insured. 
Moreover, it is a delicate art to determine when a particular outlay is to 
be treated as a consequence of  some other activity of the firm and not as 
part of  its labor cost. Nichols proposes that the cost of  a wage-escalator 
agreement (COLA clause) that yields higher than expected payouts be 
handled as if the firm were engaging in a speculation on the value of the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI). There is intellectual appeal to this position, 
but it seems doubtful that a labor cost measure purged of  “unusual” 
payments under an escalator agreement would be considered appropriate 
by any employer. 
The famous Council on Wage and Price Stability (CWPS) decision on 
the Teamster contract is another case in point. The Teamsters bargained 
for additional employer contributions to the pension fund to replace 
investment losses by the union; CWPS exempted this payment from the 
measure of  labor cost used in determining compliance with  the pay 
standard part of the program. Should it have done so? Nichols argues that 
investment losses by either the employer or the union (whichever one 
administers  the plan)  should  be counted as a  loss under  a  separate 
business activity and not as an addition to labor cost. But clearly econo- 
mists could come down on either side of  that issue. Had employers not 
had to make additional pension fund contributions, one presumes the 
union  might have negotiated increases somewhere else, which surely 
would have been counted as labor cost. 
For other examples of difficult issues in the measurement of  benefits, 
the reader is referred to the discussions  of  Smeeding’s  and Hamermesh’s 
papers. Abundant examples have been generated by practical experience 
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grams in other countries (see International Labor Office 1979). Issues 
that concern deferred compensation are discussed in section 1.4. Nega- 
tive benefits, such as the risk of injury or illness, and other nonpecuniary 
aspects of  the job are discussed in sections 1.5 and 1.6. 
1.4  The Time Dimension in Labor Cost Measures 
The stylized model of labor cost presented in section 1.2  is a model of a 
casual labor market in which neither employers nor workers have time 
horizons that extend beyond the current period. As Lazear (1981) points 
out, the neoclassical theory of wages, the content of which is equivalent 
to the stylized model, relates the spot market price of labor to the current 
period’s marginal product. The addition (in section 1.3) of benefits to the 
traditional  concept alters the definition of  labor costs, but  does not 
change the context of its analysis. The model remains essentially that of a 
casual labor market. 
It is clear, however, that few labor markets correspond to this model. 
Workers care about the continuity of employment, and employers desire 
continuity in their work forces, so both view labor market transactions in 
a multiperiod  setting. The employment  continuity that  characterizes 
most labor markets (Hall 1982) means that the familiar product market 
distinction between spot market and contract measures of price carries 
over to labor market analysis and affects the construction of  labor cost 
measures as surely as it does measures of  product prices. 
Two interrelated sources introduce multiperiod considerations into the 
measurement of labor cost: fixed employment costs and long-term impli- 
cit contracts. These are discussed in the following two sections. 
1.4.1  Fixed Employment Costs 
All costs are variable over some sufficiently long period. A cost is 
“fixed”  over  some time period  only if  the alternatives  necessary to 
eliminate the “fixed” cost in that period are more expensive than the 
“fixed” cost itself. 
The distinction between  fixed and variable labor costs corresponds 
roughly-but  not exactly-to  the distinction between  the number  of 
persons employed and the number of hours worked. Some labor costs 
(hourly wage payments, for example) vary in total with hours worked; up 
to the point where overtime schedules come into force, the increase in 
total outlay will be the same whether a given increase in total employ- 
ment hours is handled through additions of new employees or through 
expanding the workweek of  current employees. 
Other labor cost components do not behave as variable costs. Hiring 
and turnover produce one-time costs that must be amortized over the 
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will be undertaken only if the employees are expected to remain with the 
firm for some period of  time; this cost is a function of  the number of  new 
employees hired  or upgraded  and does not  vary  directly with  hours 
worked.  Many employment  benefit costs are not fully variable with 
workweek changes; medical insurance, for example, is usually a per 
worker lump sum cost which, though it may disappear with layoffs and 
may vary with full-time or  part-time status or  other employee characteris- 
tics, does not normally fluctuate with hours worked per week. Some taxes 
are paid partly on a “per worker” basis and this also contributes an 
element of fixity to labor cost. Hamermesh, in this volume, presents data 
indicating that fixed hiring, training, and turnover costs amounted to 
about 16-17  percent of  total labor cost in the private business sector in 
1978.19 
Though turnover and hiring costs have been long recognized as an 
element of  labor cost,20  modern analysis of  them stems from Walter Oi’s 
(1962) classic article, “Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor.” Oi pointed out 
that different classes of  workers carry different turnover costs. For work- 
ers who have specific skills needed by the firm, turnover is very costly 
because  new workers will  need training,  often through  the route of 
extensive experience on the job, before they can do what experienced 
workers can do. The implications of  this observation have been far- 
reaching and have been used to explain different cyclical employment 
patterns of  groups of  workers with varying skills, as well as aspects of 
employer  practices with  respect  to layoffs and recalls (see Feldstein 
1976). Oi, in this volume,  discusses some of  the literature that  was 
spawned by his earlier contribution. 
One misunderstanding of  the “quasi-fixed factor” analysis should be 
corrected:  It is not  a hypothesis that  the labor input is fixed to the 
production process.21  Rather, the hypothesis states that some costs of 
hiring labor are incurred on a once-and-for-all basis when employment is 
initiated and do not thereafter vary with that employee’s rate of  utiliza- 
tion. This hypothesis implies that rehiring or recalling an experienced 
worker will be less costly to the firm than hiring a new one, and that the 
firm will take account of  these “start-up” employment costs in its labor 
force policy. Okun’s (1981) “Toll” model is equivalent to Oi’s quasi-fixed 
factor hypothesis, and the implications Okun derives from the Toll model 
are restatements of  the implications summarized by Oi in this volume. 
The treatment of  training, or production of  firm-specific human capi- 
tal, in labor cost measures was the subject of  discussion between Lazear 
and Hamermesh in this volume, a discussion which illuminates some of 
the issues that arise when quasi-fixed costs are incorporated into the labor 
cost measure. Their positions can be reconciled along the following lines. 
Both, I believe, have in mind a model of production in which output is a 
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(T), and the specific human capital required is produced by the firm itself 
through training labor (L2): 
(11)  Q =f(Li, K,  T)  ; 
(12)  T =  g(L2). 
The measure of labor cost required is one component of the cost function 
that is dual to the production function of equation (ll), as derived from 
normal index number theory for input cost indexes (see section 1.2). The 
issue is: Where does the cost of L2  enter the labor cost function associated 
with equation (ll)? 
What Hamermesh seems to have in mind is a production function in 
which L1 and the specific human capital are combined into a “labor 
aggregate” (the combination of  L and T), the cost of  which consists of 
direct payments to L1  plus the cost of L2,  with the hours being those of L1. 
He therefore asks: What is an appropriate measure of labor cost for L1? 
and builds an estimate of the value of  training into his ECNT measure. 
Lazear, on the other hand, thinks that in most actual measurements 
one probably will not have separate accounting of hours for L1  and L2,  so 
instead of dividing total labor outlay by L1  (to get a measure of cost per 
unit of labor), it will normally be divided by the sum of L1  and La.  In this 
case, one would not want to treat the total outlay on L2  as an adjustment 
to the wage payments to L1,  because, as Lazear puts it, “Accounting for 
the cost  of  specific human  capital  and the teacher’s earnings counts 
twice.  ”zz 
Hiring, turnover, and training costs are included in no regularly pub- 
lished data source now available. Fixed or quasi-fixed benefit costs are 
included, when they are included, at the level of (average) current period 
outlays, which may be approximately correct or may be “good enough” 
but also may not be. Of the data sets especially assembled for the present 
volume, only Hamermesh incorporates fixed employment  It is 
clear from existing research that much more attention needs to be de- 
voted to adding fixed employment costs to measures of  labor cost. 
1.4.2  Implicit Contracts 
The traditional model of factor demand depicts an employer adjusting 
the quantity of labor to maintain equality between the current period’s 
price of labor and the value of  the current period’s marginal product of 
labor. Labor market institutionalists have criticized the traditional model 
of factor demand as lacking realism, but for the most part they contented 
themselves with pronouncements that theory was irrelevant rather than 
attempting  to improve  the  conceptual framework  for  labor  market 
analysis. 
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able of  dealing with important aspects of  the labor market behavior of 
workers and employers that are neglected in the traditional approach. 
It takes a more complex view of the labor market than is customary in 
conventional short-run analyses: in uncertainty, labor services are not 
auctioned off in quite the same way fresh fruit is. Rather, they are 
exchanged for some implicit set of  commitments, hereinafter called an 
implicit labor contract, on the part of the firm  to employ the owner of 
those labor services for a “reasonable” period of  time and on terms 
mutually agreed upon in advance. (Azariadis 1975, p. 1185) 
Examination of  explicit  collective bargaining agreements  between 
workers and employers has a long labor economics  tradition. The implicit 
contract literature emphasizes the less formal understandings that prevail 
in both union and nonunion settings and that condition the short-run 
behavior of both employers and employees. That these agreements are 
not written down affects the way they are implemented, but there is 
strong evidence that both parties perceive the existence of  unwritten 
understandings, and laid-off workers often behave as if some commit- 
ment had been broken by the employer. As a “RIFFED” federal govern- 
ment worker told the Washington  Post: “I feel the United States govern- 
ment has let me down, because I never broke faith with them. I was 
encouraged to come in. They asked me” (28 March 1982, p. A3). 
The earliest work on implicit contracts (Gordon 1974; Baily 1974) was 
directed  toward  explaining the  existence of  cyclical employment-it 
sought to explain the “sticky” wages that have long been singled out as 
the reason why declines in macroeconomic activity result in a greater fall 
in  employment and output than in wages and prices. However, the 
implicit contract view has great utility for explaining other aspects of the 
labor market. 
Because workers will not choose employers solely on the basis of wages 
but will consider all aspects of the proposed contract, other things equal, 
they will accept somewhat lower wages for a promise of less uncertainty. 
Such a relationship has long been acknowledged. Economists have often 
speculated that construction workers, for example, receive higher hourly 
wages because of frequent interruptions in employment, and they have 
interpreted the level of construction wages as compensation, in part, for 
uncertainty.%  One should note that many of the lowest paid workers have 
the least job security (see Oi, in this volume). That, however is not a 
serious objection to the implications of  the implicit contract literature. 
Employers are most likely to enter into contracts offering employment or 
earnings stability with workers who show stability in their work history. 
Our concern in this essay is for implications of  the implicit contract 
view for measuring labor cost. Three deserve attention: 
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current period costs will be incurred for the purpose of  reducing the 
intertemporal stream of labor cost. This observation obviously goes hand 
in hand with the fixed labor cost idea discussed in section 1.4.1. As Oi in 
this volume notes, an implicit contract implies the existence of fixed labor 
cost. 
2.  An employer lives up to his end of  the implicit contract because 
failure to do so may affect his reputation as a “good” employer, thereby 
influencing labor cost that must be paid at a later period. 
3.  Legally, employers cannot enforce the terms of  the long-term em- 
ployment contract. They can, however, structure pay or benefit packages 
to reward workers who adhere to the contract and to penalize those who 
abrogate it. 
With respect to the third point, that individual earnings rise with age or 
experience is a familiar statistical fact. Tradition has associated it with 
“on-the-job” training (Mincer 1974). Because the training component of 
jobs is seldom observed directly, the on-the-job training (OJT) explana- 
tion is an inference derived from the stylized model of factor demand. If 
employment were always adjusted to maintain equality between current 
period earnings and marginal productivity ,  then the experience-earnings 
profile would reflect rising individual productivity as experience accumu- 
lates. 
The implicit contract view challenges the OJT explanation for rising 
age-earnings profiles, because it predicts that wages may not equal the 
value of marginal product in every single period of the implicit contract. 
If  employers make multiperiod commitments to workers, they must find 
some way to hold the workers to their side of  the implicit bargain. One 
way is to compensate workers in the present period partly for perform- 
ance in past periods. Such compensation schemes not only tie workers to 
employers, but also assure high levels of  effort from workers (Lazear 
1981). In the implicit contract view, the president of  General Motors is 
compensated in the $1 million per year range in part because of his past 
productivity, and in part to create incentives among lower level managers 
who will strive to earn the prize some time in the future; the explanation is 
not, as the OJT view would have it, that the president’s current period 
marginal product is so high. 
Deferred compensation is a particularly effective way to reward con- 
tinuous service. Burkhauser and Quinn in this volume emphasize that 
pensions should not be viewed solely as savings plans, for they may also 
be used as instruments of the employer’s work-force policy. Burkhauser 
and Quinn show that the asset values of  pensions are arranged so that 
workers who postpone retirement past some age are penalized.  They 
view this as an integral part of  the implicit long-term contract. Pension 
provisions are arranged to encourage the employee voluntarily to termi- 
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the perceived arbitrariness of  a fixed, mandatory retirement age or of 
reducing direct earnings. 
For measuring labor cost, the most important implication of the impli- 
cit contract literature is that current period employment decisions do not 
depend, or do not depend solely, on current period cost. Since we want 
an economic measure to be relevant to economic behavior, what should 
go into labor cost measures when employers make decisions in a mul- 
tiperiod framework? 
Nearly identical problems have been discussed in the price measure- 
ment and the capital measurement literatures. Long-term contracts for 
delivery of coal and other materials specify prices that differ from the spot 
market price for the same commodity. In this case, the consensus among 
economists seems to be that both measures are wanted because they 
represent different things: The spot market price is the cost of  a ton of 
coal. The contract price, on the other hand, is the cost of the combined 
commodity “ton of  coal and assured supply.”zs 
In consumption price measurement, the multiperiod problem most 
frequently emerges with respect to durable goods, for which the con- 
sumption of  services in the current period reflects past purchase deci- 
sions. Moreover, prices on current asset markets for durable goods imply 
that the measured user cost of  services from durable goods can differ in 
the short term from rental values (see Gillingham 1983). In this case, the 
consensus holds that the current rental market provides the appropriate 
consumption cost measure, as it best represents the opportunity cost of 
consuming the services of the durable good. But even though the current 
rental value of an owner occupied house may represent the opportunity 
cost of living in it, the current rental price does not determine the quantity 
of housing services demanded, since that was determined in a multiperiod 
decision made when the owner bought the house (see Pollak 19756 and 
also Muth 1974). The multiperiod consumption decision depends on the 
array of  prices and expected prices through all the periods for which the 
decision was made. 
Pollak (19756) deals with the question of  constructing a one-period 
price measure in a multiperiod decision-making  setting. The problem he 
addresses is analogous to the employer’s labor-hiring decision under the 
implicit contract view of  the labor market. Pollak’s analysis shows that 
the solution requires information that is difficult to compile. Because the 
multiperiod decision requires that the economic agent form expectations 
of  all future prices, the current period’s measurement is, in general, a 
function of  all those prices. 
Equivalent problems have long been recognized in the capital mea- 
surement literature. The durability of  capital goods would present no 
particular analytic problems if the services of  capital goods were normally 
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producers must make investment decisions that involve multiperiod deci- 
sions on the input of  capital services, decisions that must be based on 
expectations of  prices over the investment planning period  (Diewert 
1980). Again, the measurement requires information on future prices or 
price expectations. 
Workers are also durable. Just as some capital services are rented, 
some labor services are acquired through casual labor markets. But the 
proportion of  labor services that are traded in casual labor markets is 
probably smaller than the proportion of capital services that are provided 
through rental agreements. For the majority of cases (wherever there are 
fixed employment costs), employment decisions, no less than investment 
decisions, require multiperiod planning horizons. 
Pollak’s (197%) conclusions for consumption price measurement and 
those summarized by Diewert (1980) for capital measurement appear to 
hold with full force for the problem of measuring labor cost, though the 
complexity of  the latter problem has not generally been recognized.% 
Because a labor cost index requires information on future prices or price 
expectations, as does a cost-of-living index or a measure of  capital, the 
information necessary to compute a labor cost index cannot readily be 
assembled. 
Lest this seem too nihilistic, one should quote with approval (and slight 
modification) a dictum of  Zvi Griliches: 
It is easy to show that except for unique circumstances and under very 
stringent  assumptions,  it  is  not  possible  to  devise  [an  economic 
measurement]. . . .  Despite the theoretical proofs to the contrary the 
[measurement] exists and is even of some use. It is thus of some value 
to attempt to improve it even if  perfection is unattainable. (Ohta and 
Griliches 1976, p. 326) 
Theory tells us that all economic measurement, done right, is hard. It is 
perhaps the most difficult work in economics. Recognizing what  the 
difficulties are is a major first step toward good measurement. 
In summary, the implicit contract view of  the labor market has far- 
reaching implications for measurement. Sherwin Rosen (1977) remarked 
that the recognition, some twenty-five years ago, of  the importance of 
human capital altered the perspectives of  labor economists away from 
preoccupation with current period wage differentials to concern for life- 
time income. The human capital innovation in labor economics, how- 
ever, applied to decision making by the worker. It left largely intact the 
traditional analysis of  the employer.  Though the human capital view 
emphasized  that  employers  were  hiring  a  labor  input  that  was  not 
homogeneous, employment decisions were still treated as functions of 
current period prices. The most recent revolution in labor economics 
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stood for the capital input) requires a multiperiod optimization model on 
the demand side, as does the worker-training decision on the supply side. 
Both supply of  and demand for human skills are now seen as problems 
that have a strong capital theoretic component. 
1.5  Payment and Reward Mechanisms and Other Knotty Problems 
Researchers do not necessarily tackle problems just because they are 
important ones-especially if the problems are difficult (nor should they: 
good allocation would put scarce research resources where they earn the 
greatest payout at the margin). As a result, many difficult problems in 
measuring labor cost have received so little attention that a conceptual 
framework for dealing with them is not fully worked out. 
1.5.1  Promotions and Wage “Drift” 
Frequently, a promoted worker receives a new job title and higher pay 
but no clear increase in duties. Examples are academic promotions, some 
professional promotions in government employment, and many clerical 
promotions in the private sector. Although many blue-collar promotions 
entail a trial period, which implies a change in duties, these workers 
sometimes earn seniority or longevity pay boosts within a grade or job 
classification (the federal government has a similar system). 
The method used for dealing with promotions and seniority premiums 
in measures of labor cost will depend on our economic understanding of 
what they represent. Some promotions are simply disguised pay raises. 
There is anecdotal evidence that promotion speeds in some occupations 
reflect labor market forces (again, academia provides a good example), 
which is suggestive. Richard Ruggles has argued (in a personal com- 
munication) that promotion disguised pay raises are so pervasive in the 
private  sector that  the change in  earnings for  a  panel  of  individual 
workers provides a better measure of labor cost than does taking a sample 
of  jobs (as in the BLS Employment Cost Index). This reinforces a view 
shared by many labor economists that the concept of a “job” is too fuzzy 
to use in measurement. 
One can think of models for the promotion process other than describ- 
ing them as disguised pay increases. Discrete adjustment to individual 
productivity growth with job experience is one example. In this case, 
promotion pay raises are premiums for labor quality and should not 
increase the labor cost measure. Presumably some seniority or longevity 
increases have the same interpretation. 
Alternatively, the long-term implicit contract may take the form of  a 
specified progression up the rungs of  a formal job ladder (Lazear 1981). 
As noted in section 1.4, it is much less clear how these wage changes 27  An Essay on Labor Cost 
should be treated in a one-period labor cost measure, particularly if the 
probability of promotion is related to the strength of  the external labor 
market. 
Existing data series handle promotions in different ways. Most sensi- 
tive to promotions are earnings data obtained by following samples of 
workers (CPS panel data, NLS, and PSID);n these measures fully reflect 
promotions and longevity increases as workers move up the rungs of  the 
job ladder, without any offsets. Intermediate in sensitivity are average 
hourly or weekly earnings series (AHE or AWE), the most pervasive 
government  “wage” statistic. Although promotions are fully incorpo- 
rated into AHE or AWE measures, their influence is offset by new hires 
or new entrants and by retirement; the level of the series thus reflects the 
net change in the average occupied rung of the job ladder. Less sensitive 
to promotions are fixed-weight indexes of employer labor cost (such as 
the BLS Employment Cost Index), where occupations and other control 
variables are held constant in the weights, though they may be affected by 
longevity increases if those are not explicitly controlled for. Most insensi- 
tive of  all are averages of  union negotiated wage scales or other wage 
schedules that include both promotion and longevity classes. 
It is probably true that treating different job titles as the observations in 
a fixed-weight index misses some wage increases and perhaps some job 
downgrading in recessionary periods. Average hourly or weekly earnings 
would pick up these changes. Yet, it is difficult to be very enthusiastic 
about AHE  or  AWE measures. McMenamin and Russell, in this volume, 
cite wage and salary administrators for an estimated 1-3  percent “slip- 
page” inherent in average earnings methods, presumably relative to the 
correct measure of  labor cost. 
Promotions are undoubtedly  one cause of  “wage drift,” a loosely 
defined concept associated with the difference between AHE and mea- 
sures of  labor cost derived from union or other wage schedules. How- 
ever, neither AHE nor wage schedules may move with the theoretical 
measure of labor cost or with a fixed-weight index, so it is difficult to know 
whether the wage drift notion reflects any economic reality. 
The correct treatment of promotions in labor cost measures remains a 
knotty problem. In principle, we know what we want to do: Promotions 
that reflect labor quality upgrading should be linked or adjusted out of 
labor cost measures; those that represent disguised pay increases should 
be handled so that they do  move the measurement. But there are formid- 
able data problems in determining which promotions are which, and 
economists disagree about which kind predominates. The ultimate solu- 
tion will depend on research which enables us to understand the opera- 
tion of  the promotion process, the economic role of the rungs of the job 
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1.5.2  Payment Periods 
Both researchers and statistical agencies express labor cost data in 
standardized units. Hourly pay is perhaps the most common measure- 
ment unit; CPS data are usually published in the form of “usual” weekly 
earnings. 
However, pay rates are quoted to  employees in avariety of terms. Why 
should units of labor always be defined in terms of an hourly rate? Should 
all consumer products be measured in pounds? 
In part, conversion of pay to common time units reflects the habit of 
viewing labor as homogeneous, or convertible to homogeneous units; 
were homogeneity the case, differing payment periods would be a mere 
nuisance to be eliminated by conversion before the data are used for 
analytic purposes. Since neither workers nor employers nor terms of 
labor contracts are homogeneous, it is appropriate to ask: What informa- 
tion is lost in the process of converting pay into common units? 
There must be reasons why some workers are quoted an hourly pay 
rate and others a weekly, monthly, or annual rate. A number of plausible 
explanations exist. Blocks of  work time are not necessarily perfectly 
divisible, and labor types may enter the production function in different 
ways.  In  this case,  the payment  period  may  reflect the appropriate 
quantity unit to use in defining an input into the productive process. 
Michael McKee  has suggested  (in a personal conversation)  that  the 
payment period may be determined by  the closeness of  the relation 
between the worker’s individual effort and current output. It may also be 
correlated  with  the need  for, or the  difficulty of,  close supervision 
(Lazear 1981) and whether a worker’s hours are checked carefully by 
management. Many workers on weekly salaries are not actually docked 
for limited hours away from the job, so converting their earnings into 
hourly pay rates is in some sense distorting the data. The time period for 
which pay is quoted also may be related to the rigidity of the production 
process in which the worker works (see Duncan and Stafford 1980). 
In  all these cases,  the method  of  payment  reflects aspects of  the 
employment contract that differ among labor types. Too much effort is 
probably expended on trying to reduce all pay data to some common 
denominator, and too little attention is paid to the information which 
may be lost in the conversion process. 
1.5.3 
Piece-rate workers and workers paid on commission are not paid by 
any time period. How are they to be included in a measure of  labor cost? 
Two alternatives compete.  One method is to compute per period 
earnings for commission sales workers, either hourly or weekly. For 
example, the occupational sample for the BLS Employment Cost Index 
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includes stockbrokers, and the index moves with changes in brokers’ 
weekly earnings. A second alternative uses the commission rate sched- 
ule; McMenamin and Russell note that the CWPS rule for commission 
sales workers measured earnings on such a constant output basis. There 
are problems with either alternative. 
First, in noninflationary situations, piece rates or commission sched- 
ules tend to fall over time in response to productivity improvement. 
Using the piece rate or commission schedule under these conditions will 
record a falling factor price, even though hourly paid workers in the same 
circumstance exhibit rising earnings. Trends in the piece-rate schedule 
record movements in “labor cost per unit of  output” (labor payments 
divided by productivity), rather than in the cost of  a unit of labor. 
On the other hand, coverting commission earnings to an hourly or 
weekly basis produces short-term fluctuations that are debatable mea- 
sures of labor cost. Commission compensation schemes are often utilized 
where output changes are unpredictable, which means that the firm shifts 
part of  the cost of  holding idle productive capacity to the workers.28 
Because the number of  stockbrokers fluctuates less than the level of stock 
market  transactions,  brokers’  weekly  earnings  change  with  output 
fluctuations in the firm, and accordingly the constant output rule under- 
lying the measure of  labor cost (see section 1.2) is broken. 
Alternatively, piece-rate or commission sales workers could be viewed 
as independent  contractor^.^^ The “price” for a factor of production must 
be quoted in units of that factor. If  the firm compensates labor by means 
of a payment per unit of output, this is equivalent to the firm’s purchasing 
output from a subcontractor. The firm is not buying labor inputs at all, 
even though the firm may own or supply the other factors of  production 
with which the subcontractor works. Because this amounts to defining the 
piece-rate problem out of the labor cost measure, it is doubtful that such a 
strategy will prove acceptable either for controls programs or for eco- 
nomic measurement, no matter how attractive the option may seem 
conceptually. 
Bonuses present similar problems. Lazear, in this volume, points to 
problems with Hamermesh’s inclusion of year-end and related bonuses in 
his labor cost measure, arguing that if what is wanted is a measure of labor 
cost in  efficiency units, then including bonuses that  are productivity 
related will move the labor cost measure in the wrong direction. Suppose 
we observe a group of  workers who receive bonuses depending on their 
output. One would certainly not conclude that the worker who received 
the highest bonus represented the highest labor cost to the firm. On the 
contrary, his earnings reflect some quality premium compared with other 
workers, as Lazear notes. 
On the other hand, suppose one worker were paid $300 a week with no 
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would lead one to conclude that labor cost is higher for the worker who 
receives no bonus, when in fact we do not know whether that is the case or 
not. If  a firm gives a large Christmas bonus in one year and a lower one in 
the subsequent year, it is not at all clear that such actions reflect changes 
in the quality of its work force between the two years, and it is even less 
clear that one should ignore the bonus payment in computing labor cost. 
Direct bonuses and commissions that serve as incentive pay are now 
included in the wage calculation for the BLS Employment Cost Index, 
and year-end bonuses and the like are put into the benefits section. 
Lazear does not advocate the exclusion of bonuses, but he is quite right 
that their treatment poses problems in a labor cost measure. 
1.5.4  Taxes 
Until we determine what is to be measured conceptually, it is some- 
times difficult to know what should be included in labor cost. 
Hamermesh, in this volume, treats a decline in the corporate income 
tax as equivalent to an increase in the “net cost of labor to the firm,” and 
adds this into his “COSTTAX” measure of  labor cost. David Hartman 
pointed out, in the discussion on the paper at the Williamsburg confer- 
ence, that the corporate income tax is usually thought of  as a tax on 
capital, not a cost of  employing labor. 
Hartman’s observation suggests that Hamermesh’s COS’ITAX mea- 
sure applies to situations where a relative factor price is wanted. Lower- 
ing the corporate income tax means lowering the tax on capital, which 
raises the relative price of  the labor input. The real logic of  including a 
corporate profit tax adjustment in COSTTAX pertains to the labor/ 
capital relative price ratio. 
Although it is true that adjusting either price can move the ratio in the 
proper direction, it is not so clear that one should do this by adjusting the 
labor cost figure. Suppose a researcher were to use Hamermesh’s COST- 
TAX data along with a user cost-of-capital series that adjusts for corpo- 
rate taxation (such as Gollop and Jorgenson 1980) in an input substitution 
study. That would clearly overadjust for the tax effect and distort the 
measure of relative input prices. Theory suggests that the corporate profit 
tax adjustment belongs on the capital price, rather than on that of labor. 
There is little question that labor cost measures should include employ- 
ment taxes (such as those that  support the unemployment insurance 
system), but the main measurement issues for present purposes seem to 
be incidence and distributional ones that are not well worked out. It 
would take too much space to explore these matters here (see various 
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1.6  Hedonic Methods, Labor Quality, and Compensating Differentials 
Hedonic techniques have been circulating in economics for over forty 
years. Applications have included: valuing quality differences in products 
to improve measures of  prices, real output, and productivity (Griliches 
1971); analyzing labor quality (the empirical human capital literature can 
be regarded as an application of hedonic methods); assessing intangibles, 
such as risk, to compute compensating wage differentials (Thaler and 
Rosen 1976;  Smith 1979);  and valuing air quality and other neighborhood 
amenities in the housing and urban economics literature (see the bib- 
liography of the paper by James Brown in this volume). 
Though hedonic methods have been extensively employed in empirical 
work, progress in understanding the economics that lies behind them- 
and which guides our interpretation of  the results-lagged  well behind. 
Noteworthy milestones  along the path  to  greater  understanding  are 
Rosen (1974) and the discussion  that tookplace at the 1973  meeting of the 
Conference on Research in Income and Wealth.M 
1.6.1  Interpretation of  Hedonic Results 
A hedonic function3’  is a relationship between the market price of some 
commodity and elements or attributes of that thing itself that, following 
Lancaster (1971), have come to be called “characteristics,”  that is, 
(13)  n=h(Xl,  . . . ,  Xk). 
If  the commodity is labor services, and labor is viewed as an input into 
some productive process, then the variable Il  on the left-hand side of 
equation (13) is the measure of labor cost that is computed according to 
the conceptual design outlined in earlier sections of this essay and in the 
papers  included  in this volume.  The variables XI,  . . . , Xk on the 
right-hand side are, of course, the characteristics. Giving an economic 
interpretation to the characteristics is the first major task. 
Recall that in section 1.2 the input “labor services” in the production 
function of equation (1) represented a vector of different types, skills, or 
grades of  labor: 
(14)  L = (L1, . . . , LJ. 
Each  Li might represent  an occupation  or an occupational grouping 
(clerical workers, for example). 
Under the hedonic view of the world, eachjth  observation in Li  is itself 
regarded as an aggregation, constructed from the quantities of character- 
istics embodied in that particular worker, that is, 
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Moreover ,  the characteristics are the true inputs to the production 
process. Taking the human capital literature as an example, if  years of 
education and years of  experience are productive characteristics of labor 
type &, then the quantity (years) of education and experience embodied 
in Li  are the inputs entered in the production function, rather than the 
quantity of Li.  A similar interpretation can be given for a hedonic func- 
tion on consumer goods (where the characteristics of  goods are treated as 
the true arguments of  the utility  function,  not  the consumer  goods 
them~elves).~~  An alternative rationale exists for the characteristics of 
hedonic functions when the object is to analyze outputs or 
It might be true that the productive contribution of  each characteristic 
is independent of the particular Li  in which it is embodied, in which case it 
is not necessary to distinguish between labor types once their characteris- 
tics have been enumerated. An experienced accountant is simply “more” 
labor than a beginning machine tender. Much of  the labor quality and 
human capital literature is built  on this assumption.  More probable, 
however, are situations in which (say) a year’s experience or education 
has different productive implications in various occupations, or where 
characteristics that are important in some occupations are of  little or no 
value in others. In both these cases, occupations matter in the structure of 
production, and there will be one aggregation rule (Xi in eq. [15]) for each 
occupation.” 
In any event, in the “hedonic hypothesis” the arguments of  a hedonic 
function are, at least in principle, the arguments of either a utility func- 
tion or a production function, as the case may be, when the hedonic 
function is viewed from the buyer’s side of  the market. This does not, 
however, imply that the hedonic function is derivable from or directly 
related to the functions that economic units optimize. The function h in 
equation (13) is not Xi in equation (19,  and the one is not a function solely 
of  the other. 
Instead, the hedonic function provides an estimate of the constraint on 
the behavioral unit’s optimization problem. Or, to put it more precisely, 
those constraints can be derived from hedonic functions, since empiri- 
cally the forms used to estimate hedonic functions have never explicitly 
taken on the form of  the behavioral constraint. 
For simplicity in both the exposition and the economics, assume that 
the production function of equation (1) contains only one labor type, Li, 
or that a suitable partitioning exists so that one can consider input Li  in 
isolation  from all other inputs. Labor  input Li  is, however, not ho- 
mogeneous,  as  it  contains  productive  characteristics  XI and  X, in 
amounts  varying with different individuals (an example might be a service 
industry in which the output of  service depends on the years of  training 
and experience of  individual workers). 
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puts in proportions such that ratios of their unit costs equal ratios of their 
marginal productivities.  In the present case, the productive inputs are 
characteristics XI  and X,; a production isoquant for these two inputs can 
be derived in the regular manner (examples are A and H in fig. 1.1). If  XI 
and X2  are education and experience, the firm’s production problem 
involves finding an optimal composition of these productive labor-force 
attributes. 
Information on unit factor (characteristic) costs can be obtained from 
the hedonic function. Still assuming for simplicity only two characteris- 
tics, the hedonic function of  equation (13) can be used to compute 
(16)  p = p(dX2/dX1, II  constant). 
The value of the p function of equation (16) gives the relative price of XI 
in terms of  X2 and is computed from the coefficients of  the hedonic 
function of equation (13). Since an isocost curve shows combinations of 
inputs that can be obtained for the same outlay (and in this case the inputs 
are characteristics XI  and X2),  the p function can be viewed as tracing out 
an isocost curve, or a portion of  one, in characteristics space. One of 
these is designated as p in figure 1.1. There is one such locus for every 
value of  labor cost for which workers can be hired. 
Rosen (1974) emphasizes that the locution of the hedonic function (or, 
inter alia, of the p function) is determined by all suppliers and demanders 
in the market, and that it is an envelope of  the behavioral functions on 
both sides of  the market. The present section emphasizes a different 
aspect of that model-the  hedonic function as a carrier to  the employer of 
economic information on factor costs. Notation for more than two char- 
acteristics is obvious, but the extension to cases where capital and mate- 
rials costs or other labor types are incorporated into the cost minimiza- 
tion problem is tedious, though not fundamentally different (see Triplett 
1982). 
1.6.2  Hedonic Methods as Adjustments for Labor Quality 
Hedonic functions provide information about the prices or unit costs of 
characteristics, and therefore about the costs of productive inputs in cases 
where the characteristics are the inputs to the productive function. This 
rationale for hedonic functions can be used to motivate their use for 
adjusting labor cost measures for labor quality. This subject deserves a 
whole paper on its own. The following is accordingly only an outline of a 
more comprehensive treatment. Parts of  it are adapted from Triplett 
(1982) and Pollak (1983). 
We first develop the notion of labor quality in the context of measuring 
labor cost. The basic input cost theory outlined in section 1.2 of this essay 
applies to any definition of a productive input. Accordingly, index num- 
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the case where productive inputs are the characteristics of  workers- 
rather than the normal case in which inputs are taken to  be quantities of 
undifferentiated labor hours (sometimes referred to as “goods space”). 
Assuming for simplicity that capital and materials are homogeneous 
goods, and, for  the moment, a casual labor market (to avoid the complex- 
ities of section 1.4),  the production function of equation (1)  is rewritten as 
(17)  Q  = €?*(K,  M7  XI, .  e  , 
The cost function of  equation (2) becomes 
(18)  C = C* (R,  P, anlaxi, . . . , aII/aX,;  Q)  , 
where C*  ,  the “characteristics production cost function,” is interpreted 
(as before) as the minimum cost of acquiring a set of inputs sufficient to 
produce some specified level of Q. Computing equation (18) requires, in 
addition to the prices of capital and materials, implicit prices for each of 
the labor characteristics (XI,  . . . ,  X,). Hedonic methods are a means for 
determining those implicit prices, aII//a&. 
Just as the input cost index of section 1.2 was computed from the cost 
function of equation (2), the “characteristics input cost index” is the ratio 
of  values of  C*  under alternative price regimes (including alternative 
implicit prices in eq. [13]). A more extensive treatment of the input cost 
index in characteristics space is given by Triplett (1982). 
A change in labor quality is identified with increases or decreases in the 
quantities of  labor characteristics used as inputs in the production pro- 
cess. In the characteristics input cost index, it is natural to take the notion 
of  labor “quality” as nothing more than a shorthand expression for the 
quantities of  characteristics in  the vector XI,  . . . ,  X,.  Contrary to 
presumptions often encountered in the literature, analysis of labor qual- 
ity does not require any explicit scalar measure of  “quality” (such as a 
“labor quality index,” which in fact provides no additional information). 
Shifts in labor characteristics may reflect simple substitution among 
characteristics in response to changes in relative input prices. The inputs 
of  characteristics included in C* in one period are therefore not exactly 
the same as in some other period; this, of course, is normal in any input 
cost index. Thus, when labor quality is identified with the productive 
labor characteristics, XI,  . . . ,  X,, a “constant quality” input cost index is 
nothing more than the normal specification of  a theoretical input cost 
index defined on input characteristics-an  index in which the inputs 
(characteristics) included in both periods are the minimum cost set that 
are sufficient to produce  the specified output level, Q.  A  “constant 
quality” index is not necessarily one in which there are no changes in 
labor characteristics. 
Of course, when making comparisons of labor cost, the level of output 
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teristics that are inconsistent with the constant output measurement rule, 
and, for these cases only, a “labor quality adjustment” must be made. 
Such an  adjustment  is interpreted  as responding  to a change in  the 
characteristics set (XI,  .  . . ,  X,)  by altering the inputs in Q* in such a way 
that C* (eq. [MI) refers to the same level of output (a specified value for 
Q) in both index comparisons. 
In the theoretical, or exact, input cost index, the “quality adjustment” 
may be quite complicated, involving all of the inputs and not just the one 
whose characteristics actually changed. One also has to consider rather 
carefully the source of  the changes that have been observed, which is 
equivalent to specifying precisely the question that is being addressed. 
We leave these complications aside (see Triplett 1982). 
Note that in general the “hedonic” or quality adjusted price index 
cannot be computed from the hedonic function alone. Like any exact 
index, the Characteristics  input cost index requires information from the 
cost function C*, and hence from Q*, whereas the hedonic function only 
provides information about a portion of the firm’s  isocost line for produc- 
tive inputs (eq.  [16]).  The “hedonic price indexes’’ that exist in the 
literature (see Griliches 1971 and Triplett 1975) are not based on cost 
functions and are best interpreted as approximations to the true charac- 
teristics cost indexes, somewhat in the fashion that ordinary fixed-weight 
price index formulas are thought of as approximations to the true indexes 
in conventional index number theory.35 
In  summary, the “constant quality”  input  cost index is simply the 
theoretical input cost index defined in characteristics space. I use the term 
“simply” advisedly. Though simple in concept, such an index requires an 
enormous amount of information, including not only the characteristics 
costs, but also the full production or cost function defined on characteris- 
tics. Its computation involves a host of  difficulties (Pollak 1983). 
If  the production and cost functions are known, then one can possibly 
use implicit prices obtained from hedonic functions to compute charac- 
teristics input cost indexes. However, as will be spelled out in section 
1.6.3, if  production and cost functions on characteristics are not known 
(the usual case), serious difficulties surround using hedonic prices to 
estimate them. This implies that estimating the exact input cost index 
from price and quantity information is not straightforward in a character- 
istics world (see also Pollak and Wachter 1975). 
To this point, the discussion has concerned the cost index for the full set 
of inputs in equation (17). As noted in section 1.2,  a labor cost index is a 
subindex of the full input cost index. Its construction requires separability 
conditions on production and/or cost functions. For the characteristics 
input cost index, the analogous condition specifies that labor characteris- 
tics (or their unit costs) be separable from capital and materials inputs (or 
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problem somewhat because the labor cost index becomes a function only 
of the arIldx.  terms of equation (18) and the level of  a “labor aggregator 
function,” the value of which is held constant over the index comparison. 
The previous  discussion of  the meaning and interpretation of  quality 
change and the use of hedonic methods to evaluate it carries over to the 
labor cost subindex in the form of an extension. However, the required 
separability conditions for constructing subindexes seem less plausible, if 
anything, for the labor cost index defined in characteristics space, for they 
imply that the substitution of (say) education and “raw” labor is indepen- 
dent of  the mix of  capital inputs. 
In empirical work  one seldom has the luxury of  working with the 
theoretical or exact index, for the information requirements of  exact 
indexes are prohibitive. The best one normally has available are indexes 
constructed  as close approximations to the theoretical concept.  One 
criterion of adequacy in an approximation is the extent that the measures 
take account of, or control for, quality variation. 
A curious anomaly of  the literature on economic measurement is the 
disparity that exists between concerns for “quality error” in price and 
labor cost measures. In the case of  price indexes, quality error has long 
been judged a serious limitation on the validity of  empirical measures 
(Price Statistics Review Committee 1961). On the other hand, taking 
average hourly earnings (total payrolls divided by hours paid for) or the 
related hourly compensation series (both are described in Antos, this 
volume) as a labor cost measure is a common practice that normally raises 
the most modest of demurrers. 
One would judge from the extent of the literature and of professional 
discussion that the labor market measures were the better of the two. Yet 
that is clearly not the case. Whatever the quality error remaining in 
available price indexes (the Consumer Price Index, for example, or the 
various forms of the Producer Price Index), a great amount of attention is 
paid  to limiting quality variation  in price  quotes accepted  for those 
indexes, and price indexes have been designed in other ways as well to be 
far closer than are AHE measures to the concepts needed for economic 
analysis (Gillingham 1974 describes the use of  the cost-of-living index 
theory as a framework for constructing the Consumer Price Index). By 
the  normal  standards  applied  to price  indexes,  AHE  measures  are 
woefully deficient, essentially because only total establishment payrolls 
and hours are collected, rather than an earnings or a labor cost concept. 
Gollop and Jorgenson, in this volume, are among the few economists 
to pay serious attention to the labor quality problem. Remarking that 
AHE or hourly compensation measures “conceal an enormous heter- 
ogeneity,” they set out to purge them, to the extent possible, of  error 
attributable to their near total lack of  control for labor quality shifts. The 
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the magnitude of the quality problem in normal earnings measures-their 
data are factored into some 81,000 cells to control for labor quality, 
roughly 1600 cells per industry. 
Gollop and Jorgenson assume an industry labor aggregator function 
that is translog in form. The traditional rationale for aggregation of this 
type is to interpret each of  the 1600 cells to be  a separate factor of 
production-that  is, the vector of labor services in the production func- 
tion of  equation (1) has 1600 elements. Though it is also traditional to 
assume that labor services are a natural aggregate, the theoretical jus- 
tification for doing so requires that the cost function (eq. [2]) be separable 
on these  1600  cells.  Evaluating  the  plausibility of  this  separability 
assumption is nearly impossible owing to the sheer mass of  data. 
The material in this section supplies an alternative rationale. Gollop 
and Jorgenson’s ten occupational cells are taken as corresponding to the 
Li  categories in equation (14). Age and education (age being a proxy for 
work experience) within industry-occupation groupings represent labor 
characteristics-the  X’s  of equations (13), (15), and (17), and the charac- 
teristics are  the true productive inputs (or are proxies for the true inputs). 
Further division of these cells by workers’ sex follows precedent in the 
literature and presumably reflects a correction for omitted characteristics 
or occupational detail. Under this rationale, the heterogeneity of  worker 
productivity is accounted for by  the characteristics,  and a labor cost 
subindex that controls for labor quality can be constructed from the 
characteristics using the appropriate separability assumptions on equa- 
tion (18). 
Though Gollop and Jorgenson  do not formally adopt the rationale 
presented here, their work is not inconsistent with it. Their procedure 
amounts to grouping individuals within occupations by the quantities of 
characteristics embodied in them. This kind of grouping is an alternative 
to an explicit computation of  a characteristics labor cost index. It also 
corresponds to the way  quality  change  is  typically handled  in  price 
indexes. 
An explicit characteristics-space rationale for work  of  the  Gollop- 
Jorgenson type has several advantages over the traditional (or “goods- 
space”) rationale. (1)  Testing for functional separability involves only the 
inputs, age (experience), and education in each Li  category, not a set of 
1600 inputs. (2) The characteristics variables have an explicit economic 
justification rather than appearing as ad hoc adjustments, which is the 
case in traditional treatments.  (3) Grouping the characteristics by  oc- 
cupation is supported by the Hicksian aggregation rule outlined in note 
34,  and  those  occupational  groupings  can  be  tested  empirically by 
straightforward tests on earnings functions; the traditional approach 
leaves occupational groupings arbitrary, and provides no natural method 
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rationale, “quality adjustment” can be incorporated into the theory of 
production and index numbers in a natural way that permits the analysis 
of alternatives; the traditional conceptual mode leaves quality change as a 
mathematical parameter imposed from outside economics whose charac- 
ter is obscure, properties ambiguous, and identification improbable.” 
The Gollop-Jorgenson data base provides researchers for the first time 
with labor cost measures by industry that are controlled for labor quality 
variation. It is a particularly valuable contribution in view of the fact that 
the only government provided labor cost measure that does control for 
occupational and other shifts (the BLS Employment Cost Index) has little 
industry detail, which greatly limits its analytical usefulness. 
Gollop and Jorgenson follow most studies of  labor quality in using 
some variant of  the human capital approach, so the characteristics that 
are included in the analysis are education and experience measures. This 
approach has the weight of literature and precedent behind it, yet three 
reservations should be expressed about the human capital treatment of 
labor quality. 
First, education and experience are not characteristics in the sense that 
this term was defined and used in equations (13) and (17). Education and 
experience are not in themselves productive characteristics, but they are 
proxies, or are associated in some way with skills that are productive or 
with the acquisition of productive skills. We can think of the true mea- 
sures as the outputs of  processes in which years of  education and of 
experience are  the inputs. Of course, the true measures of skills are really 
wanted in equations (13) and (17), and they would be used there if  they 
were available.% 
Second, economists have taken both education and experience as good 
proxies for productive inputs because both are associated with increases 
in earnings, and standard theory predicts a relation between variance in 
wages and a measure of marginal product. However, Lazear (1979) has 
shown that rising experience-earnings profiles may result when firms and 
workers make implicit, multiperiod contracts, even if there is no associa- 
tion  between productivity and experience.  Lazear and Moore (1981) 
estimate that only 11 percent of the association between experience and 
earnings originates from the higher productivity of  more experienced 
workers; the remainder of the rising experience-earnings profile consists 
of  deferred payment incentives under long-term implicit contracts. Ex- 
perience is undoubtedly more nearly a productive attribute for the youn- 
ger groups of workers, as Lazear (1976) himself and many other econo- 
mists have shown. For older workers, use of experience as a labor quality 
indicator would  appear to overadjust labor  cost measures  for labor 
quality. 
Of  course, the implicit contract argument does not invalidate consid- 
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would presumably still want to “standardize” labor cost measures for 
differing points on the time profile of  the implicit contract (see section 
1.4).  But there is reason to question the traditional view of the economic 
role of  experience, and there is room for a great deal of  additional 
research that will specify the appropriate way of  treating experience in 
the measurement of labor cost, and that will define the variables that do 
measure productive labor characteristics and can be used for studies of 
labor quality. 
Third, and most important, the human capital view of labor quality has 
often led to the notion that labor quality is a unique scalar measure and 
that rankings of  workers or groups of  workers by some “labor quality 
index”  are useful for  comparisons over  long time periods or across 
regions (see Johnson in this volume). 
Consideration of equations (17) and (18) suggests that any labor qual- 
ity measure is some aggregation of  labor characteristics, and, as in any 
aggregation, weights matter.  Weights in this case could be  marginal 
products of labor characteristics or the implicit prices of equation (18), in 
which case the labor quality measure amounts to a quantity index of 
characteristics. The  labor quality measure, in other words, is not a unique 
scalar  measure,  but  is  instead  a  construction  that  resembles  Gross 
National Product  or any other aggregate quantity measure  in  which 
disparate quantity units are combined into some value measure in order 
to make meaningful economic statements. It has long been understood 
(see Samuelson and Swamy 1974, and the references cited there) that 
such quantity measures produce rankings that are not invariant to relative 
prices; for example, real consumption in Norway may be above that of 
Costa Rica when valued by one country’s prices, but below when valued 
by the other’s. 
It has not been generally understood that the same principle holds for 
quality measures. The frontiersman of the last century lacks the skills for 
success in a modern labor market to the same degree that a computer 
systems analyst is ill-equipped for the world of  Natty Bumppo. Nichols 
remarks in this volume that today’s unskilled worker would have been 
regarded as semiskilled at the turn of the century because today’s worker 
has more education; perhaps so, but many skills that were important then 
have become obsolete, and we generally lack the information to rank 
workers of both periods by weighting systems that apply to each period. 
The habit of taking years of  schooling as an invariant measure of  labor 
quality imposes today’s weights on intertemporal comparisons of  labor 
skills and obscures the fact that a comparison from yesterday’s perspec- 
tive may well reveal the classical “index number problem.” 
Even in contemporary comparisons, uncritical application of  scalar 
human capital measures produces potential errors. Layard (1979, p. 52) 
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have earned less than those who did not go to college but had the same 
measured abilities” (emphasis supplied). If  the implicit prices for labor 
characteristics produced by college were to  fall sufficiently (or were lower 
in some parts of the country than in others), those other, nonmeasured 
skills possessed by workers who specialize in nonintellectual occupations 
would be more highly valued by the market, leading to changes in the 
rank ordering of worker quality. 
This analytic problem deserves more attention in the construction of 
labor quality measures. 
1.6.3  IIedonic Methods and the Estimation 
of  Labor Market Differentials 
A hedonic function yields an opportunity locus that can be interpreted 
as a producer’s isocost curve. Having estimated such a thing, it is natural 
to want to use it for something else. For example, one might wish implicit 
prices for characteristics for use in explaining demands for those charac- 
teristics. 
In the labor cost context, we might suppose (despite the caveats of the 
last section) that characteristics are human capital components, such as 
education and experience. They might also be strength and dexterity, or 
any other elements that are associated with the productive contribution 
of the labor input. Equation (13) is estimated as one form of the ordinary 
“earnings” function. Alternatively and analogously, one may wish to use 
hedonic prices to estimate consumers’ demands for air quality or other 
nonmarket goods, starting from a hedonic relation similar to equation 
(13)’ but involving (say) real estate prices and housing and environmental 
characteristics. A third example, from the labor economics literature, 
involves use of  hedonic functions to determine wage differentials that 
compensate workers for risky or unpleasant occupations. 
The question we wish to address takes the following  form: Under what 
conditions, if  any, can we use the coefficients of the earnings function to 
explain the firm’s employment of  productive characteristics? 
One proposal is to estimate the hedonic function (eq. [13]) in the first 
stage. Next, one estimates the production function of equation (17) or the 
input demand equations derived from it, in which the labor input is 
defined  by  quantities of  labor characteristics,  and the characteristics 
implicit prices (aIl/aX1,  . . . ,  aII/dX,) are employed as unit input costs. 
This is often referred to as the “two-stage’’ proposal and was originally 
outlined in Rosen (1974). 
Figure 1.1  suggests the problems this proposal poses. The p function in 
figure 1.1 comes from equation (16) and is drawn for a particular value of 
labor cost. Its slope shows relative implicit prices for labor characteristics 
XI and X,. Isoquants A and H  are portions of  production functions of 41  An Essay on Labor Cost 
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employers A and H. Cost minimization by each results in employment of 
factor proportions indicated by a and h, respectively. 
Suppose initially that nothing was known about the production func- 
tions, that we merely observe the implicit prices from the p function and 
the input quantities corresponding to the points a and h. There is in this 
example variance in relative characteristics prices (slopes of  the p func- 
tion at a and at h), a necessity for an empirical demand study. Moreover, 
there is also variance in the quantities of characteristics XI and X,. In the 
absence of  information about the shape and position of  the production 
functions, superficial examination of the prices and quantities suggests a 
situation which,  when  encountered  in  “goods  space,”  signals to the 
researcher that “all’s well.” 
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and quantity data have not been generated from the kind of conceptual 
experiment on which demand  theory rests.  Differences in the firms’ 
production  functions,  stemming from  the inherent  technology,  from 
entrepreneurial heterogeneity, or whatever, have caused firms A and H 
to “locate” at different points on the hedonic function. Because the firm 
in a hedonic world takes the p function as given, and not necessarily the 
prices, as is the case in the goods world (a point noted by Rosen 1974), it 
can in a sense choose both p’s and q’s in its cost minimization process. 
Thus, variation in characteristics prices and quantities is not sufficient 
to justify use of  characteristics-space data in a demand analysis. The 
quantity differences between the solutions chosen by firms A and H are 
not  functions of  the p function prices alone, and the implicit prices 
cannot, in a cross-section study, explain differences among firms in the 
quantities of characteristics employed. Similar points can be made about 
the use of hedonic prices to explain housing demand. 
Before proceeding, several points can be noted about the empirical 
dilemma portrayed in figure 1.1. First, the dilemma does not rest on 
nonlinearity of  the p function, as figure 1.2 makes clear. Essentially, 
figure 1.2  presents in characteristics space the empirical fact that has long 
limited  the  ability to do cross-section demand  studies with  data  on 
“goods”-insufficient  variance in relative prices. 
There is, however, a certain irony to this discussion. The majority of 
hedonic  functions that  have actually been  estimated have  employed 
functional forms for which the p function is linear. The well-worked 
semilog functional form, for example, which gives a nonlinear hedonic 
function,  has  a linear  p  Had  economists understood  that 
relative characteristics prices were in fact constant for the hedonic func- 
tions most of them were working with, they might never have set off to try 
to use hedonic prices in a cross-section demand study in the first place. It 
is  ironic  that  it  took  a  double  misunderstanding  about  the  hedonic 
framework to generate this research. Nonlinearity in the p function, not 
nonlinearity of the hedonic function, is the necessary condition for gener- 
ating variance in relative characteristics prices; however, nonlinearity of 
the p function is not a sufficient condition to justify the use of  hedonic 
prices in a characteristics demand study. 
Second, the research dilemma of figure 1.1  is inherent in the concept of 
a heterogeneous product. If  all demanders were like firm A in figure 1.1, 
heterogeneous products would either disappear from the market-leav- 
ing only one outcome (ul,  u2)-or,  in the case in which the inputs are 
supplied in heterogeneous form by act of  nature (the labor input), the 
hedonic function would coincide with firm A’s production isoquant, as 
noted by Rosen (1974). But in the latter case, no buyer would care which 
variety was purchased, so no relevant heterogeneity exists, and the goods 
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Third, the research  dilemma portrayed in  figure 1.1 has been well 
anticipated in theoretical work on consumer demand and, in a sense, on 
labor quality. Lancaster (1971),  noting that buyers undoubtedly  have 
different tastes, proposes something like the following: First, estimate 
the p function (Lancaster uses programming methods to determine the p 
function directly, without  estimation of  the hedonic function). Then 
assume that consumers (firms buying inputs) all have the same utility 
(production) functions, save for a shift factor. One can then estimate a 
distribution function to account for the locations of  consumers (firms) 
around the p function. This procedure would yield the following informa- 
tion. Starting from the slope of  the p function at point a, firm H,  faced 
with the same set of  characteristics prices would choose point g, giving 
two points on its isoquant; the same procedure gives point i on firm A’s 
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priori specification of the production function that there is little left over 
to estimate.  (Lancaster’s example involves a Cobb-Douglas utility or 
production function, and there is little need to estimate elasticities in that 
case.) To my knowledge nothing has come of  Lancaster’s suggestion. 
That the dilemma of figure 1.1  would emerge in studies on labor quality 
was also in a sense anticipated in Hicks (1963). Hicks’s hypothesis had the 
“better quality” employer making better use of the higher quality work- 
ers.  Shifts in demands for worker skill levels might be explained by 
variations in the skills, education, and training of  entrepreneurs, and 
entrepreneurial  characteristics  could  be  taken  as the  “shift  factor” 
accounting for the distribution of  isoquants around the p function in 
figure 1.1. 
The paper by James Brown in this volume explores whether the re- 
search dilemma of figure 1.1  can be resolved by treating it as some variant 
of  the standard econometric identification problem.  In the standard 
problem, functions such as supply and demand curves can be identified if 
some variables can be found which are unique to one of  the two. Iden- 
tification permits estimation of the effects of  variables which are common 
to both-price  elasticities for supply and demand, for example. In the 
problem at hand, the effort is to find some variables in the employer’s 
characteristics demand functions that are not contained in the hedonic 
functions and that account for the distribution of demanders around the p 
function, as in figure 1.1. 
After  considering  rather  exhaustively  a  catalog  of  econometric 
methods that might identify the production functions from the hedonic 
functions, Brown finds none that appears very promising. In general, it 
seems difficult to conceive of  a situation in which one can be sure that 
differences in quantities of characteristics demanded are not attributable 
to location decisions of  demanders around the p function, as well as 
cost-minimizing  reactions to the relative prices themselves. Brown’s con- 
clusion parallels Pollak and Wachter’s (1975) finding that implicit prices 
have limited usefulness for explaining outcomes of household production 
models. 
Thus, econometric solutions seem unattainable; the essence of  the 
solution, if  the problem is  solvable at all, involves generation of  an 
appropriate data set, not elaboration of  econometric methods. The way 
to look at the problem is to ask whether one could plausibly interpret data 
sets in a way that is consistent with the conceptual experiment that 
underlies normal demand analysis-that  is, can one envision a particular 
price-quantity data set on characteristics as having been generated by a 
process of  both varying the characteristics prices faced by an individual 
economic behavioral  unit  and observing the changed  characteristics 
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To show how hard it is to come up with the required data set, it is worth 
noting a recent example in which a plausible case was constructed. G. 
Brown and Mendelsohn (1981) estimated demand for “fishing holes” by 
characteristics.  First, they estimated hedonic functions across various 
fishing sites to obtain implicit prices for the attributes of each site. Then, 
on the assumption that fishermen did not choose their place of residence 
on the basis of  proximity to a fishing site, and using transportation 
expenses from home to site as an element of  the cost of  the fishing 
expedition, they constructed, essentially, figure 1.3. In this case, because 
the distance to the site was a unique element in the hedonic function for 
each  fisherman, they were able to estimate fishermen’s demands for 
different characteristics of  fishing spots, an accomplishment of  consid- 
erable ingenuity which will undoubtedly be a substantial service to plan- 
ning outdoor recreation facilities. However, the fact that the Brown- 
Mendelssohn data set relates to a problem that is of considerably less than 
universal interest among economists is probably no coincidence. It is an 
ingenious solution to a very special problem, and although it may suggest 
equally ingenious solutions to others, prospects are not high for generat- 
ing appropriate data sets with more widespread applications. 
One should, however, put all this in proper perspective.  First, the 
research dilemma protrayed in figure 1.1 greatly limits the usefulness for 
behavioral studies of hedonic estimates of implicit prices, but it does not 
imply that they are useless. Thaler and Rosen (1976), fully recognizing 
the locational choice problem of  figure 1.1, use it to specify that their 
estimates of  the compensating wage differential for risk were a limit (a 
lower one in their case) on the true estimates: in figure 1.1 terms, the 
price of XI  necessary to  induce H  to employ al units of XI  is far lower than 
what is required to induce A to locate at that point, and accordingly, A 
requires less than H to “compensate” for locating in the vicinity of al. 
Fully understanding the nature of hedonic prices facilitates using them in 
appropriate ways. 
Second, the conceptual problems we have been discussing are merely 
characteristics-space forms of problems that are ancient in normal goods- 
space demand analysis. For example, it has long been known that there 
are regional differences in food prices and consumption. Taking regional 
variations as appropriate data for demand analysis requires the assump- 
tion of common utility functions-that  regional consumption differences 
do not reflect regional differences in tastes. Thus, strong assumptions are 
always necessary to justify using cross-section data in demand analysis. 
These problems are so timeworn that they are frequently ignored in 
empirical applications in goods space. Only because working in charac- 
teristics space is new do the problems discussed in this section seem 





What makes labor markets unique is the exchange of  packages by 
participants on both sides of the market. Workers sell bundles of produc- 
tive characteristics to employers. They receive bundles of  wages and 
benefits that include not only the traditional “fringes,” but also greater or 
lesser amounts of job characteristics such as desirable working conditions 
(freedom from regimentation and arbitrary supervisory practices,  for 
example), workplace safety and health, job amenities such as attractive 
office furniture and surroundings, employer subsidized consumption on 
the job, training and advancement opportunities, and so forth. The wage 
payment is but a single element in a complex exchange of commodities, 
services, and financial claims. 
Because both workers and employers are heterogeneous, the range of 
bundles from which both make choices is enormous. Other things equal, 
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variation in one element of  either bundle will be offset by equivalent 
variations in other elements.” If  the wage is the element of the compensa- 
tion package that offsets variation in some other element, or the net 
effect of  a group of  elements, then labor markets will exhibit a set of 
“compensating  wage  differentials”  that  reflect  worker  valuations on 
everything from a favorable climate to employer subsidized lunches to 
the aversion many workers have to working for very large employers (Oi, 
this volume). Considerable research on compensating differentials has 
been undertaken in recent years (see the bibliographies in Smith 1979 and 
C. Brown 1980). 
The model underlying compensating wage differentials is basically the 
wage-benefit model of equations (3)-(8).  As an example, consider job 
safety which can be viewed as a benefit (Thaler and Rosen 1976; Sider 
1981). Workers will choose less safe jobs only when employers pay a 
higher wage to compensate them for the risk of injury (eq. [sa]). Alterna- 
tively, the employer can invest in safety equipment; this will reduce the 
wage premium that must be paid, and the “amount” of safety that will be 
provided by market mechanisms will be determined by equation (8).41 
Notice, however, an anomaly: If  the employer “pays” for workplace 
hazards in the form of higher wages, it will be recorded in his labor cost 
data. Dealing with work hazards through purchase of safety equipment 
will, in most accounting systems, show up as an increase in the quantity of 
capital equipment. Since both compensating wage payments and expend- 
itures for safety equipment are necessary because risk creates disutility 
for workers, both costs need to be considered in labor cost measures on a 
comparable basis. 
The same point  can be made about many other nonpecuniary job 
attributes. Increases or decreases in them may imply changes in the level 
of  wages that must be paid, but there will be concomitant increases in 
expenditures on other factors, so that considering only those expendi- 
tures that are explicit to labor misses labor cost that shows up in the form 
of  employer expenditure on some other input. 
Positive or  negative nonpecuniary elements may be provided by a third 
party, such as government or an act of  nature. Employers who gain (or 
lose) by receiving (or not receiving) these “free” job characteristics will 
adjust wages accordingly. For example, the interarea labor cost compari- 
sons conducted by Johnson (in this volume) control for differences in 
worker quality among areas; but that, though vital, is only one side of the 
story. Perhaps both union and nonunion wages are high in Detroit not 
because of  the direct and indirect effects of  union power but because of 
Detroit’s amenity levels relative to competitive areas. Comparisons of 
labor payments among employers who receive differential benefits by act 
of government or  nature may yield misleading information about the true 
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To make things more difficult for measurement, it may not be possible 
to separate out of the employer’s total cost structure those aspects which 
are uniquely associated with the benefit that workers get from an amenity 
provided by a third party. Roback (1982) shows that when an amenity 
(for example, a favorable climate) is both desired by workers and inde- 
pendently  productive  to firms, then the effect on land rents can  be 
determined, but one cannot tell the direction of the effect on wages. In 
seeking to allow for the effects of  amenities in the labor cost measure- 
ment, we lack even the clue of  sign that will tell us whether estimated 
values of  regional amenities are reasonable or not. 
The existence of  compensating wage differentials thus means that a 
unique measure of labor cost may not be extractable from the employer’s 
total input cost, because the level of labor cost is not independent of the 
quantity of  capital or of  some other input. Compensating differentials 
may also imply that the cost function is not separable on its labor compo- 
nent (see section 1.2), because safety hazards, for example, are likely to 
differ among occupations, and adding safety equipment will change the 
occupational wage structure.  But the separability property relates to 
aggregation; the dependence of labor cost on the quantity of capital in the 
presence of  compensating differentials would be true even if the produc- 
tion function contained only one type of homogeneous labor. Thus, the 
challenge raised to labor cost measures by compensating wage differen- 
tials encompasses, but goes beyond, the classical separability issue. 
This problem is unique to labor input to  production and occurs because 
each party to a labor market transaction cares about the characteristics of 
the other party. There are some other markets for which this is also a 
fact-rental  housing is one clear example. But the problem seems far 
more pervasive and far more important in measuring the cost of the labor 
input than for any other productive input, and it is considerably more 
important than is the case for most consumer goods markets. Measuring 
labor cost is hardly a simple economic task. 
1.7  Conclusions 
This  essay has  addressed  the  problem  of  producing  a  conceptual 
framework for measuring labor cost that reflects a modern view of  the 
operation of labor markets. The theory of labor cost that is derived from 
the  stylized model  of  production  on which  the theory  of  economic 
measurement is based (section 1.2) has the following properties that are 
inconsistent with empirical knowledge of  labor markets: 
1. Unit factor cost consists exclusively of  money wage payments. 
2.  The labor unit is homogeneous. 
3.  A casual labor market prevails. 49  An Essay on Labor Cost 
4.  Production costs can be separated uniquely into labor cost compo- 
nents and costs of  other inputs. 
Relaxing the first two restrictive properties of  the stylized model in- 
volves difficult empirical  and data development tasks,  but  does not 
challenge the fundamental validity of  the labor cost measure.  Adding 
costs of benefits clearly is required to reach an adequate measure of labor 
cost for nearly any purpose (section 1.3). And though there are more 
conceptual difficulties in  measuring some of  these benefits than first 
meets the eye, for the majority of  them the measurement can be done 
within the traditional production theoretic context. 
Similarly, dealing with worker heterogeneity can be handled theoret- 
ically by  modeling  the productive  characteristics of  workers  and  by 
extending the basic theory of index number measurements into charac- 
teristics space (section 1.6). The formidable conceptual and theoretical 
problems that remain cannot be denied. But those pale beside the empiri- 
cal  and data base  requirements  that have inhibited  progress  on the 
analysis of heterogeneity in both goods and labor markets. 
Far deeper conceptual problems surround the other two major points 
discussed in this essay, for they call into question whether a one-period 
measure of  labor cost, or indeed a measure of labor cost at all, is either 
appropriate or achievable. 
Because casual labor markets seldom obtain in the modern economy, 
employment decisions are not  based  on a single period’s labor cost 
(section  1.4), and for the cost concept that is relevant to employers’ 
decisions, the single period labor cost is not well defined. The identical 
problem has been discussed in the literature on the measurement of 
capital and of  consumer prices, so it is known to require information 
about future prices or expected prices. The problem is no more and no 
less difficult when the objective is measuring labor cost, but the important 
point is that this serious difficulty be recognized. 
Whether a single period measure is relevant or not, perhaps the most 
basic question to  the  entire inquiry is whether a labor cost measure can be 
distinguished uniquely from a measure of all input costs. In the stylized 
model, this issue takes the form of an empirical question  about cost 
function separability (section 1.2), but in this there is nothing unique to 
labor input; the technical issue of  separability can be raised about any 
class of  inputs, from lubricants to office supplies. What makes the labor 
input uniquely difficult is that the seller of labor cares not just about the 
wage but also about employment conditions and other characteristics of 
the buyer. Because there is so much employer heterogeneity, the variety 
in compensation packages will be great. And variation in elements of the 
compensation package leads to variation in the quantities of  other inputs, 
especially capital. This dependence between quantities of one input and 50  Jack E. Triplett 
“prices” paid for another poses special and very difficult problems for the 
measurement of  labor cost. 
This essay began with the observation that labor economists tended to 
view the subject as too difficult because of the institutional detail, while 
theorists thought it conceptually too simple to be worth much attention. 
It concludes with the observation that-whatever  the jungle of  institu- 
tional detail that must be considered-the  greatest difficulties are concep- 
tual ones. That, of  course, is why  economists should find the subject 
interesting. 
Notes 
1. The theory of  consumption price measurement stretches back to Wicksell, but see 
Fisher and Shell (1972), Pollak (1971), Samuelson and Swamy (1974), Diewert (1976), 
Blackorby, Primont, and Russell (1978), and Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). A survey of 
empirical studies in price measurement is Triplett (1975). See also Griliches (1971). 
2.  Information sources for the surveys cited include: Center for Human Resource 
Research (1975) for NU;  Duncan and Morgan (1975) for PSID; Rees (1974), Kehrer 
(1979), and Spiegleman and Yeager (1980) for the Income Maintenance Experiments; 
Mellow (1981) and U.S. Department of  Labor (1980) for CPS data. 
3. Though I believe there is no question that the demand side of  labor economics has 
been neglected, the habit of thinking only in supply-side terms is so ingrained that experi- 
ence shows I should present an example to support the statements in the text. The regional 
wage differential literature in labor economics will serve. 
Johnson, in this volume, notes a “current consensus” that a North-South differential 
exists in nominal wages, but not in real wages; the literature he cites and the model of his 
paper take these putative facts as consistent with labor market equilibrium: “.  . . other 
things equal, a 1  percent increase in the cost of living in an area willincrease the equilibrium 
wage  in  that  area by  1 percent”  (Johnson, this volume, p. 311). But a nominal wage 
differential implies a production cost differential, and, if  employer mobility exists, will 
provoke interregional movement of  employers, unless somehow the wage differential is 
offset by cost differentials for other factors (highly unlikely if  there are opportunities for 
employer specialization). Equivalence between nominal wage and cost-of-living differen- 
tials is consistent only with  predictions from the theory of  worker behavior and is not 
consistent with general equilibrium at all. In fact, an empirical finding so extraordinarily 
inconsistent with theoretical prediction is suspect; if it were true, it ought to suggest a 
vigorous research effort to determine why. Instead, it seems to be an article of  faith that 
nominal wage differentials, when found, can be “explained” by living cost differentials. For 
a more balanced view of  regional differentials, see Hanushek (1981); the regional eco- 
nomics literature has also treated economic differentials from an alternative perspective 
(see the items cited by Muth, this volume). 
4.  It is astonishing, but nevertheless true, that at this date one still has to defend the use 
of measurement theory in formulating economic measurements, even among researchers 
who comfortably use labor market theory for other purposes. One can only guess about the 
reasons for such an anachronism, but one possibility is the relative lack of understanding, 
even among sophisticated data users, of the conceptual complexity of some of the issues that 
arise in the construction of economic data combined with impatience with theoretical work 
that does not produce immediately usable “answers.” The main use of theory in economic 51  An Essay on Labor Cost 
measurement is to sharpen measurement concepts and to provide an integrated framework 
against which consistent resolution of practical measurement problems can be assured. To 
be useful, the theory need not-and  seldom does-provide  ready “cookbook” guidance for 
measurement decisions. Its role is comparable to John Maynard Keynes’s description of the 
relation between economic analysis and economic policy: 
The Theory of  Economics does not furnish a body of  settled conclusions immediately 
applicable to policy. It is a method rather than a doctrine, an apparatus of the mind, a 
technique of thinking, which helps its possessor to draw correct conclusions. (as quoted in 
Reder 1982, p. 16) 
The use of  theory in measurement does not assure that the measurements will always be 
correct, but experience has shown that the alternative produces ad hoc, inconsistent, and 
ultimately indefensible decisions. 
5. Terminology is not uniform in the literature in part because the explicit literature on 
the theory of input price measurement is sparse. Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982) 
employ the term “Malmquist index” of input prices. Also, an “input cost index” sometimes 
refers to a computation intended as a proxy for an output price index (a weighted average of 
wage rates and materials prices, for example, in lieu of  a measure of the price of construc- 
tion), but that is not the purpose of  the measurement discussed in this essay. 
6.  Actually only their factor quantity index numbers are explicitly based on  the translog 
model; their factor price indexes are defined implicitly  with respect to this model and are not 
derived (as exact input cost indexes would be) from the cost function that is associated  with 
their production model. There is little reason for supposing this makes much difference in 
their labor cost measures. Deriving the labor cost indexes from the cost function that is dual 
to the translog production model would be prohibitively expensive, owing to properties of 
the translog model that, in general, assure that factor quantity and factor price indexes have 
different functional forms. For the theoretical statement of these issues, see Samuelson and 
Swamy (1974) and Diewert (1980). 
7. Braithwait (1980) found that the Laspeyres index differed from exact indexes of 
consumption prices by only about one-tenth of an index point per year, a result compatible 
with estimates in Christensen and Manser (1976) and Goldberger and Gameletsos (1970). 
Diewert (1976) and Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982) show theoretically that certain 
types of  conventional index number formulas will  give  close  approximations to exact 
indexes. 
8.  “Roughly” because separability of  the cost function is  equivalent to comparable 
separability of the production function only for certain production function forms, not all of 
them. See Blackorby, Primont, and Russell (1978). 
9. The appropriateness of  the Grant and Hamermesh approach requires interpreting 
their demographic groupings as proxies for distinct inputs to the production process-that 
is, if  occupations, skill levels, or other characteristics actually define categories of  labor 
input (the Lls of  eq. [14]), one must assume that these characteristics  vary by age, sex, and 
race in such a way that the latter identify, at least partly, the former. See the discussion of 
this point in section 1.6.2. 
10. The parameter JI indicates the rate of exchange between benefits and wages on  the 
boundary of  the worker’s choice set. It can be identified as a locational parameter selected 
from a hedonic frontier (see section 1.6.3, and also Atrostic 1982,  who implements a similar 
approach empirically). Competition will tend to bring JI into equality both with the price at 
which workers could buy benefits on  the market and with the employer’s marginal cost of 
providing them (see eq. [S]), and for this reason the price of benefits has often been assumed 
to be one or the other. Taking the market price of  benefits as the value of  JI, however, 
introduces the implicit assumption that the worker can sell them, which is generally untrue. 
Setting JI identically equal to the employer’s marginal cost of providing benefits is likewise 
inappropriate, because benefits are presumably provided when the worker places a higher 52  Jack E. Triplett 
value on inframarginal units of them than it costs the employer to provide them. Assuming 
in the worker’s full income constraint that + is measured by  either the market price of 
benefits or the employer’s cost of providing them improperly introduces elements of  the 
solution to a maximization problem into the constraint that bounds the problem. Put 
another way, this assumption amounts to specifying  that equation (8) is identically true for 
all levels of  benefits, when  in fact equation  (8)  holds only for the  benefit level that 
corresponds to the cost minimizing and utility maximizing employer-employee contract 
point. 
11. Labor supply to a firm is composed of  an hours of  work decision and a choice of 
employer. Equation  (4) does not necessarily require that workers have different labor 
supply responses to wages than to benefits, though the results of Atrostic (1982) suggest this 
to be the case. It does imply that, once in the labor market, workers will choose among 
alternative employers  according  to their preferences among employer provided benefits and 
market purchased consumption goods. Moreover, the choice of  employer (and therefore 
the employer’s  task of selecting  an appropriate package of  wages and benefits) is not trivial, 
since alternative compensation packages are available in the market either because em- 
ployers have different relative costs of providing various benefits, or because workers have 
different preferences for benefits, or both. See Antos and Rosen (1974). 
12. Freeman (1981) discusses the case in which there are start-up costs for offering a 
benefit to employees, which introduces another term on the right-hand side of equation (8). 
This has no effect on the results and is ignored here for simplicity. 
13. Some researchers (including  Smeeding  in this volume and Woodbury 1981),  reason- 
ing that because benefits are not taxed they are worth more to workers, have used the 
marginal tax rate to inflate the value of  benefits, rather than reducing the quantity of goods 
that can be purchased out of wage income (as suggested in the text and as incorporated into 
the work of  Leibowitz in this volume). This practice seems to reflect the habit of writing 
wages as an argument of  the utility function instead of  (or as a proxy for) the market 
purchased goods that belong there, and of  omitting either one equation (typically the 
demand for leisure) or one price (usually consumption goods) from the system being 
analyzed. In some cases the only objection to the alternative treatment is that it lacks 
elegance; in others, however, errors result, as David points out in his comment in this 
volume, because the lack of  clarity obscures mistakes in logic. 
14. David, in this volume, makes the excellent  point that the marginal tax rate will in the 
long run itself be a function of  the proportion of  income taken in the form of  benefits 
(because tax rates will be adjusted upward to recoup the revenue loss). This means that 
taxes will only affect the consumption of  benefits of the average worker if  there is some sort 
of money illusion; but because the growth of nontaxable benefits shifts tax burdens toward 
lower income workers, the main effect of nontaxable benefits may be on income distribution 
and not on the average consumption of  benefits and market purchased goods. 
15. Freeman (1981) presents five possible reasons, but the only one I find logically 
supportable is the possibility that workers can have more faith that benefit plans are sound 
when a union acts as their agent to oversee them and would, accordingly,  be more willing to 
trade wages for benefits  in unionized firms. This motivation seems  inadequate to account for 
the size of  the union-nonunion differential in benefits. 
16. Atrostic (1981) presents findings that suggest the “single parent” model predomi- 
nates: Other things equal, female dominated workplaces have higher levels of benefits. 
17. For the policy relevance of  the elasticity of  demand for labor, see Solow’s (1980) 
presidential address. 
18. See the table on p. 504 of Freeman (1981). The difference  between the two estimates 
reported in the text is statistically significant at the .01 level. 
19. I form this estimate from comparing  the ECNT (which  includes  an estimate of hiring, 
training, and turnover costs) and COSTWK measures of  table C.2 in Appendix C of this 
volume. The comparable figure for manufacturing in 1978 was 13-14  percent. 53  An Essay on Labor Cost 
20.  Oi cites J. M. Clark. Morgenstern (1963, p. 186) includes  the “value of tenure” as an 
21.  This error is implied by  Okun’s discussion of  Oi’s work (Okun 1981, pp. 17, 24). 
22.  On the other hand, I do not understand Lazear’s words, “without counting the 
output of the human capital,” that follow the passage quoted. Because firm-specific  human 
capital is by definition  useful only to the firm itself, its production can only be regarded as an 
intermediate input for the firm in question; thus, it is not failing to account for its output in 
equation (12) that leads to the error,  but inappropriately accounting for its inpur in equation 
element of  labor cost. 
(11). 
23.  Hamermesh’s data series are reproduced in Appendix C. 
24.  This explanation has an ancient history. However, my  own observation, from a 
relatively  short tenure as a construction  worker quite a number of years ago, is that the trade 
attracts individuals  who have strong preferences for consuming leisure in concentrated and 
uninterrupted  blocks of time. Thus, construction workers tend to be those for whom 
employment interruptions require the smallest premiums (Thaler and Rosen 1976 make the 
same point in a different context). The compensating  wage differential explanation may be 
only part of  the reason why  construction wages have traditionally been higher than in 
alternative employments. 
25.  Some contracts make it clear that the incentive for entering into the contract came 
from the other side of  the market and that what was wanted was assured demand. 
26.  Diewert (1980, p. 475) writes: “In the previous section I may have left the impression 
that from a theoretical point of view constructing  a capital aggregate  is no more difficult  than 
constructing a labor aggregate.” He then proceeds to list and discuss  complexities that make 
capital measurement a particularly difficult problem, including price expectations, interest 
and depreciation rates, treatment of  taxes, definition of  the capital input, time period for 
measurement, choice of  index numbers, and so forth. Since most of  this catalog of  the 
“special problems” of capital measurement appear in some form in this essay as problems of 
labor cost measurement, I would modify Diewert’s statement to read: “From a modern 
understanding of  the labor market, constructing a labor aggregate is little, if  any, less 
difficult than constructing a capital aggregate.” 
27.  See references in note 2. 
28.  Seiler (1982)  reports  that  a compensating differential for  earnings uncertainty 
accounts for up to 50 percent of  the higher earnings of  incentive pay workers in some 
occupations in the industries he studied, though the average appears to be substantially 
lower. 
29.  Lazear (1981) notes that piece-rate compensation is the extreme case of  a short-run 
labor contract, in which workers are compensated only for current period output. In normal 
cases, a worker’s current period compensation is at least in part a reward for performance in 
past periods. Piece-rate payment systems will evolve when the costs of supervision  are high. 
30. Terleckyj (1976), particularly the articles by  Ohta-Griliches, King, and Triplett, 
with the discussion by  Barzel and Ingram. 
31.  This section is based in part on Triplett (1976), modified to apply to labor markets. 
32.  In Triplett (1976) I introduced the device of  characterizing hedonic transactions in 
consumer goods as if  consumers purchased groceries in preloaded  carts, with  prices 
attached to the carts. The preloaded carts play the role of conventional  goods, variations in 
the assortments of groceries they contain amount to quality differences as we usually think 
of them, and the quantities of the various groceries are the characteristics.  The characteris- 
tics (groceries) are, of course, the true arguments of the utility function, not the goods (the 
preloaded carts). Estimating hedonic functions  on the preloaded grocery carts is equivalent 
to determining the prices charged for the individual grocery items. The price attached to the 
cart is simply total expenditures on the groceries contained in it. The grocery cart simile 
carries over by  analogy to the case of  labor input. 
33.  In the supplier case, the characteristics are viewed as joint outputs of  a productive 54  Jack E. Triplett 
process. Implications of this approach in the context of measuring output and productivity 
are discussed in Triplett (1982). 
34.  Both cases imply that hedonic functions will differ by  occupation, either in the 
coefficients (implicit prices) on the characteristics  they have in common, or in differing lists 
of  characteristics included in them. In the consumption case, I have suggested (Triplett 
1971) that testing for equivalence of  hedonic functions across commodity groupings is one 
way of  resolving the old empirical  problem: “What is a product?” The extension of that idea 
to the labor market implies that hedonic functions can in principle be used to distinguish 
between groups of workers who are appropriately classified as separate factors of produc- 
tion, as distinct from other groupings that may represent differing qualities of  what is 
essentially  the same productive factor. Clerical workers or blue-collar workers are appropri- 
ate empirical groupings  if  a single hedonic function describes all the workers in the group; if 
not, one tests lower level aggregations, such as secretaries or machinists. This empirical  rule 
using hedonic functions amounts to an extension of  Hicksian aggregation theorems into 
characteristics space, since in effect the “rule” permits aggregation over characteristics so 
long as characteristics prices (the hedonic coefficients) move together in the cross section. 
This proposal is quite different from that of Cain, Hansen, and Weisbrod (1967) and offers 
substantial empirical advantages for testing existing occupational classifications for eco- 
nomic relevance. 
35.  The literature contains an enormous amount of  confusion about the relation be- 
tween empirical “hedonic price indexes” and the exact or theoretical price index. The usual 
source of confusion  is the failure to distinguish between the hedonic function  itself (eq. (131) 
or its derivative, the p function of  equation (16), aqd the characteristics input cost index 
based on equation (18). This confusion has led to the misguided attempt to derive the 
former from the latter, or to use the functional form of the production or cost function to 
derive permissible functional forms for the hedonic function-as,  for example, in Lucas 
(1975) and Muellbauer (1974). Since articles of this genre seem always to conclude (incor- 
rectly) that the well-worked semilog form is impermissible for hedonic functions, it is worth 
emphasizing that the functional form of the p function, and hence of  the hedonic function 
itself, is independent of  the form of  production, cost, or utility functions and is wholly an 
empirical matter. Assertions to the contrary by Lucas and Muellbauer are really statements 
that the cost function of  equation (18) cannot adequately be represented by  a semilog 
function, a fact that is well known; the form of equation (18) says nothing about the form of 
the hedonic function. 
36.  The parentheses make explicit reference to the  distinction between direct and 
indirect separability. See note 8. 
37.  Fisher and Shell (1972) present an insightful analysis of  quality change from the 
traditional view that probably extracts as much from that approach as can be obtained. 
Nevertheless, their discussion of  “parametrizable” quality change has limited applicability 
to empirical work and leaves the nature of  quality change so obscure that its parameter 
cannot be distinguished from technical change that shifts the production function. 
38.  The empirical use of  proxy variables and proxy relations is not restricted to labor 
market  hedonic functions; it is  an integral part  of  the empirical tradition of  hedonic 
functions in product markets, where the problems created by  the use of  proxies are well 
known (Triplett 1969). 
39.  If 
In  II = po + PIX, + pzX2  + e, then 
ax,lax, (In II = const.) = p2/pI, 
which is clearly a constant for all XI and X,. Thus, the semilog function yields a linear p 
function, which means it is linear in what might be called the relative price dimension, which 
is the one that matters most for doing demand analysis. That all aln II/aXj  are increasing 
within the semilog form means that increasing outlays on  characteristics imply increasing 55  An Essay on Labor Cost 
unit characteristics costs, when the characteristics  are purchased in a single “package.” See 
Triplett (1976) for further discussion. 
40.  The uniqueness of  both worker and employer does present the possibility that 
workers will be assigned among employers in such a manner that each will be located in a 
uniquely “best” job match. If  so, none of  the available alternative job opportunities for a 
particular worker will offer an exactly equivalent bundle of job characteristics,  and no  other 
worker will be quite so satisfactory for the employer. But given a large enough number of 
employers and workers, unique assignments will create only small deviations and the 
statement in the text will be approximately true. 
41.  Because this example is intended only to be illustrative, and then only for labor cost 
measurement, there is no need to discuss the numerous caveats that would be necessary for 
a serious analysis of safety. In particular, there is nothing in equation (8)  that shows that the 
amount of  safety provided by the market is the “right” amount by some criterion, or that 
shows that workers can always correctly judge differences  in safety between similar jobs, or 
that pertains to any of the issues surrounding the regulation of workplace health and safety. 
See Thaler and Rosen (1976). 
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